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 An Empirical Reexamination of State 
Statutory Compensation for the Wrongly 
Convicted 
Jeffrey S. Gutman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An appropriate measure of a just society is how it treats those whom the 
government harms most severely.  As frequent and well-publicized exonera-
tions have been etched into the public consciousness over the last several years, 
a number of scholars have engaged in the study of compensation for such a 
group – those wrongly convicted.1  The general tenor of the resulting articles 
is one of disappointment.2 
 
* © Jeffrey S. Gutman 2016.  Jeffrey S. Gutman is a Professor of Clinical Law at the 
George Washington University Law School.  I thank Dean Blake Morant for providing 
me a summer research grant to write this Article.  I further thank Adele Bernhard of 
New York Law School and Professor Stacy Brustin of the Catholic University Law 
School for their constructive comments.  Professor Samuel Gross of the University of 
Michigan Law School provided permission to use the data assembled by the National 
Registry of Exonerations.  Maurice Possley of the Registry is the source of a great deal 
of my compensation data.  I owe a debt of gratitude to research assistants Garrett Fitz-
gerald, Nicole Giles, Benjamin Gutman, William Pauley, and Natasha Sim.  With great 
admiration and respect, I acknowledge my clients Donald Gates, Kirk Odom, Santae 
Tribble, and Cleveland Wright, whose wrongful convictions serve as the guiding nar-
rative of this Article. 
 1. A word is in order on vocabulary.  Throughout this Article, I use the term 
“wrongly convicted” or “unjustly convicted” interchangeably.  I use these terms to de-
scribe persons whose criminal convictions have been vacated or reversed, either be-
cause of a determination that the individual was factually innocent of the crime for 
which he or she was convicted, or because of the disclosure of evidence consistent with 
innocence.  In this sense, these terms overlap with the definition of “exoneration” de-
veloped by the National Registry of Exonerations described infra note 128. 
 2. See Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Com-
pensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 
DRAKE L. REV. 703 (2004) [hereinafter Bernhard, Justice Still Fails]; Justin Brooks & 
Alexander Simpson, Find the Cost of Freedom: The State of Wrongful Conviction Com-
pensation Statutes Across the Country and the Strange Legal Odyssey of Timothy At-
kins, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 627 (2012); Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A 
Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665 (2002); 
Howard S. Master, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for Compensating the 
Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97, 102 (2004).  See also Michael 
Leo Owens & Elizabeth Griffiths, Uneven Reparations for Wrongful Convictions: Ex-
amining the State Politics of Statutory Compensation Legislation, 75 ALB. L. REV. 
1283, 1298 (2012) (“We must recognize, however, that the statutory victories in some 
states to compensate the wrongly convicted are more hollow than they are solid, given 
1
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The notion of compensating the wrongly convicted is hardly new; it was 
pioneered by Professor Edwin Borchard over a century ago.3  In 1913, Wis-
consin became the first state to enact a no-fault wrongful conviction compen-
sation statute.4  There is a long-standing and near-universal understanding that, 
with respect to the wrongly convicted, “[e]xcept when an innocent defendant 
is executed, we hardly can conceive of a worse miscarriage of justice.”5  There 
can be little dispute that the government has a corresponding moral responsi-
bility to provide appropriate remedies to those individuals.6  Yet, 18 states still 
lack no-fault compensation laws, and most of the remarkably dissimilar exist-
ing state laws share two characteristics in tension with that moral duty. 
 
that the laws include weak provisions for the amount and quality of compensation.”).  
Press and opinion pieces similarly criticize the inadequacy of state wrongful conviction 
compensation statutes.  See, e.g., Opinion, Paying for Years Lost Behind Bars, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2016, at A20; Karen Brown, Opinion, Life After Wrongful Conviction, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2016, at SR10; Jessica Pishko, Tim Atkins Was Wrongfully Im-
prisoned for 23 Years – Why Is California Denying Him Compensation?, NATION (Mar. 
9, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/tim-atkins-was-wrongfully-imprisoned-
for-31-years-why-is-california-denying-him-compensation/ (discussing the claim of 
Timothy Atkins, a 2007 exoneree, featured in Brooks & Simpson, supra). 
 3. See Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of 
Criminal Justice, 3 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684, 706 (1912); Edwin M. Borchard, 
State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 52 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 108, 110 (1914); EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932) [hereinafter BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT]; Edwin 
Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U. L. REV. 201, 208 
(1941).  See also John H. Wigmore, The Bill to Make Compensation to Persons Erro-
neously Convicted of Crime, 3 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665, 665–67 (1912). 
 4. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2017). 
 5. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 6. For some, that moral duty is supported by the utilitarian notion that society as 
a whole, which benefits from the operation of the criminal justice system, should bear 
the cost when the operation of that system causes harm to the wrongly convicted.  As 
Professor Borchard put it, “Where the common interest is joined for a common end, 
with each individual subject to the same danger [i.e., erroneous conviction], the loss, 
when it occurs, should be borne by the community and not alone by the injured indi-
vidual.”  BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 3, at 390.  Professor Bern-
hard makes the same point: 
 
After all, it is the state, through operation of one of its most essential services – 
the criminal justice system – that has inflicted the harm.  Although it may be 
impossible to hold any individual law enforcement officer, or any particular 
municipality, liable, the state’s responsibility for the injury is sufficient to gen-
erate a moral obligation. 
 
Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. 
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 93 (1999) [hereinafter Bernhard, When Justice Fails].  See 
also John Martinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting “Liberty-
Property,” 59 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 537 (2008); Master, supra note 2, at 110–17. 
2
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First, there is a hypervigilant worry of compensating those who are 
viewed as potentially undeserving.  Many statutes, for instance, place on the 
claimant the formidable burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence 
that he or she is factually innocent7 and/or require the claimant to demonstrate 
that he or she had engaged in no misconduct that caused his or her prosecution 
or conviction.8  Second, and the issue addressed in this Article, most prescribe 
astonishingly modest awards and/or impose caps on monetary compensation 
that are far below those awarded by most juries and judges in recent federal 
civil rights cases arising from wrongful convictions and in cases brought under 
state compensation statutes without caps.9  Such statutes largely ignore the na-
ture, severity, and variation of injuries suffered while incarcerated; fail to ac-
count for post-release damages, such as ongoing psychological and medical 
harms; and overlook the pressing needs many exonerees have for social, voca-
tional, medical, and educational services following what is often years of 
wrongful incarceration.  In sum, most of these statutes reflect a begrudging 
 
 7. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-101(1)(a) (West 2017); D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-422(2) (West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1(2) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:572.8(A)(2) (West 2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2) (2017); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 1(C) (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
691.1755(1) (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4603 (West 2017); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2017); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(5)(c) (McKinney 2017); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2)(e)(2) (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(3) (West 
2017).  Colorado’s statute, for example, permits payment only when the conviction is 
set aside for “reasons other than legal insufficiency of evidence or legal error unrelated 
to the petitioner’s actual innocence,” COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-102(2)(a)(I), and 
when the claimant shows actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. §§ 
13-16-101(1), 13-65-102(1).  In Nelson v. Colorado, 2017 WL 1390727 (U.S. Apr. 19, 
2017), a case dealing with Colorado’s procedures to obtain a refund of fines and pen-
alties through its Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons statute when a convic-
tion has been overturned, Justice Alito described the statute (which similarly governs 
the process for obtaining compensation for wrongful conviction) as “harsh, inflexible, 
and prevents most defendants whose convictions are reversed from demonstrating en-
titlement to a refund.”  Id. at *11 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 8. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-422(2) (requiring that the petitioner show that he did 
not engage in misconduct causing his prosecution); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
702(d) (West 2017) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(d); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-
b(5)(d); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10B (West 2017).  But see HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§661B-3(b) (West 2017) (assigning certain cause or contribute disqualifying conditions 
as affirmative defenses requiring proof by government by a preponderance of the evi-
dence).  Particular states have other similarly intended disqualifying quirks, such as a 
requirement that the claimant receive a pardon from the governor (Maine, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and Tennessee), that only DNA exonerees are eligible for compensa-
tion (Missouri and Montana), and that those convicted of a felony prior to the wrongful 
conviction are ineligible (Florida). 
 9. By “prescribed award,” I mean a statute requiring a particular daily or annual 
compensatory award, regardless of facts or circumstances.  By a “cap,” I mean a ceiling 
on a possible award, usually expressed as the maximum annual and/or total payout. 
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rather than a restorative approach to remedying the harm done to the wrongly 
convicted. 
Despite all this, state compensation statutes are rightly viewed as the best 
of even less appealing alternative methods of redress for the wrongly con-
victed.10  While federal civil rights and some common law tort suits can be 
extremely successful in particularly egregious cases in which government mis-
conduct caused the wrongful conviction, such misconduct is not present in 
some cases and difficult to prove in others.11  Private legislative bills to com-
pensate the unjustly convicted require political muscle and fortitude, if the state 
permits such private bills at all,12 and, therefore, promise to help very few of 
the wrongfully convicted.13 
To be sure, the decades since Professor Borchard’s initial proposal have 
seen progress.  The number of states with compensation statutes has increased 
steadily.  Some of the more recent statutes, or amendments to older statutes, 
are more sensitive to evolving societal perceptions of the horrors of wrongful 
incarceration.  Caps are being raised and more statutes offer elements of restor-
ative reentry services that many exonerees need.  But the balance between state 
 
 10. Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 2, at 706–08; Lopez, supra note 2, at 
704; Deborah Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly Compensated – How to 
Fund Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes, 44 IND. L. REV. 503, 510–17 
(2011). 
 11. Other scholars have canvassed the range of difficulties in obtaining compen-
sation for wrongful convictions through civil rights and tort theories.  Shawn Armbrust, 
Note, When Money Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrong-
fully Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 161–66 (2004); Michael Avery, Obstacles 
to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongful Conviction: An Overview, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 439 (2009); Bernhard, Justice Still Fails, supra note 2, at 722–38; Bernhard, When 
Justice Fails, supra note 6, at 87–92; Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven 
Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims Under State Compen-
sation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123, 131–34 (2010); Lopez, supra note 2, at 
690–98; Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful Convictions, 
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 136–52 (2010). 
 12. Some state constitutions bar private bills.  See, e.g., Twp. of Mahwah v. Ber-
gen Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 831–83 (N.J. 1985); Rector v. State, 495 P.2d 
826, 827 (Okla. 1972); Adams v. Harris Cty., 530 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1975). 
 13. As of 2009, only 9% of the 240 people exonerated by DNA evidence obtained 
compensation through a private bill.  Making Up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully 
Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair Compensation, INNOCENCE PROJECT 13 
(2009), https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/innocence_pro 
ject_compensation_report-6.pdf [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT, Making Up for Lost 
Time].  See also Armbrust, supra note 11, at 167–68; Adele Bernhard, A Short Over-
view of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly Convicted: What Works, What Doesn’t 
and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 408–09 (2009); Kahn, supra note 12, at 134–35; 
Lopez, supra note 2, at 698–700.  As Professor Bernhard points out, the fact that some 
wrongly convicted individuals receive compensation through a private legislative bill 
supports the notion that there is a moral obligation to compensate such people.  Bern-
hard, When Justice Fails, supra note 6, at 96. 
4
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fiscal concerns and just redress remains askew.  This imbalance palpably harms 
a category of claimants to state compensation and support that are among those 
least deserving of parsimony and least equipped to surmount it. 
States, though, have reason to worry.  Tort-based full compensation in 
these cases can be enormous.  Fear of episodic, unplanned, and potentially 
large payouts in wrongful conviction cases leads to tough prerequisites to re-
covery and ungenerous prescribed awards and caps.14  The uncertainty and 
worry of fiscal exposure that drives caps is real and understandable.  As dis-
cussed further below, following several substantial judgments in favor of 
wrongly convicted individuals, Connecticut replaced its progressive uncapped 
statute with one that imposes damage caps.  A proposal to do the same was 
made in the District of Columbia.15  It is not enough, then, to view state com-
pensation statutes only from the perspective of the claimants, deserving as they 
are for compensatory relief.  We must consider the interests of the state as well. 
A reassessment of these statutes should begin by understanding that the 
exonerated have different characteristics and needs.  Some of the wrongly con-
victed are exonerated and released from custody at the same time; others are 
exonerated well after release.  The former are very likely to have immediate 
needs for financial, medical, and social service support, while the needs of the 
latter may be less pressing.  For some, unjust imprisonment was relatively 
brief.  For others, it spanned decades.  Some experienced devastating injuries 
while incarcerated, such as assaults, solitary confinement, psychiatric harm, 
and contraction of infectious diseases like HIV and hepatitis C, while others 
managed to avoid these kinds of harms.  Some lost opportunities to parent chil-
dren born prior to incarceration and to care for aging parents; others did not.  
Some were educated and employed when convicted and thus clearly suffered 
lost wages, while others had different educational and employment profiles.  
Some may be eager, or at least willing, to devote the time, resources, and emo-
tional energy to litigating such claims and exposing their harms – and potential 
government misconduct – to the public, while others may be reluctant to wage 
a second battle – often painful, expensive, and lengthy – against the govern-
ment that wrongfully imprisoned them. 
Instead of accounting for the varying characteristics, needs, and inclina-
tions of the exonerated, most state statutes mechanically set unyielding, but 
widely variant, per-year awards and damage caps.  There is a better way.  The 
approach I recommend here is based in large part on my empirical research, 
which has gathered compensation claims data for each of the 1900 persons 
 
 14. Lopez, supra note 2, at 705.  The most absurdly low are those of New Hamp-
shire and Wisconsin, which cap damages at $20,000 and $25,000, respectively, regard-
less of the duration of the wrongful incarceration.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 
2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2017).  The Wisconsin State Assembly unan-
imously passed a bill in February 2016, increasing the cap to $1 million.  Assemb. 460, 
102d Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2016).  The bill, however, died in the state Senate.  Senate Puts 
Off Vote on Conviction Compensation, WIS. L.J. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://wislawjour-
nal.com/2016/02/16/senate-set-to-approve-conviction-compensation/. 
 15. See infra Part II.C. 
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listed in the National Registry of Exonerations as wrongly convicted in a state 
court since 1989.  The results of that study are summarized, state by state, in 
Table 1.  They show that a surprisingly small percentage of exonerees seek and 
obtain state compensation and that the average amounts paid per year of wrong-
ful incarceration are disappointingly low. 
The reassessment of state compensation statutes presented here considers 
five elements: (1) the funding mechanism, (2) compensatory adequacy, (3) the 
provision of non-monetary social and other services, (4) claimant choice, and 
(5) an opportunity for expedited resolution.  These design elements are drawn 
and adapted from two different federal approaches to remedying harms to large 
numbers of people – the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and 
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund – regarded as among the more 
successful mass tort compensation schemes developed to substitute for, in 
whole or in part, traditional tort-based litigation.  Together, a redesign involv-
ing certain elements of these programs can both relieve some state fiscal con-
cerns and allow the exonerated to select a remedial approach that better suits 
his or her individual needs. 
Before venturing too far, I should reveal the source of my perspective.  I 
represented four men in their claims for damages – Donald Gates, Kirk Odom, 
Santae Tribble, and Cleveland Wright – who were wrongfully convicted of se-
rious crimes in the District of Columbia.16  Each of these men spent over 20 
years in prison for crimes they did not commit.17  Donald Gates was in prison 
when DNA analysis exonerated him, after which he was immediately re-
leased.18  Our remaining three clients, in contrast, spent long periods on post-
release parole prior to exoneration.19  For each client, my co-counsel and I 
 
 16. I have served as co-counsel in these cases with the New York law firm of 
Neufeld, Scheck & Brustin.  See Gates v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 11-0040 
(D.D.C.); Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239 (D.C. Super. Ct.); Tribble 
v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B (D.C. Super. Ct.); Tribble v. Greene, 
Civ. No. 15-710 (D.D.C.); Wright v. Greene, Civ. No. 15-1067 (D.D.C.).  Peter Neufeld 
and Barry Scheck of that firm are the co-founders and co-directors of the Innocence 
Project.  About, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about (last vis-
ited Mar. 15, 2017). 
 17. Gates v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2014); Odom v. 
District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *1–3 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015); Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 
2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016); United States v. 
Wright, No. 1978 FEL 4060 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2015) (Amended Certificate of 
Actual Innocence). 
 18. See Gates, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1; see also Donald Eugene Gates, NAT’L 
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera-
tion/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3233 (last updated Nov. 20, 2015) [hereinafter 
Gates, NAT’L REGISTRY]. 
 19. See generally Kirk Odom, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3943 
(last updated Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Odom, NAT’L REGISTRY]; Santae Tribble, 
6
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sought damages under the uncapped D.C. Unjust Imprisonment Act (“D.C. 
Act”).20  In Gates, Tribble, and Wright, we also filed federal civil rights claims, 
asserting that police misconduct caused the wrongful conviction.21 
The pain of failure does not warp my perspective.  As explained further 
below, D.C. Superior Court judges awarded Kirk Odom $9,654,500 and Santae 
Tribble $13,236,527 in damages under the D.C. Act.22  Following a federal jury 
trial in which two former D.C. homicide detectives were found liable for fed-
eral civil rights violations, the case brought by Donald Gates settled for 
$16,650,000 – the largest single-person settlement in D.C. history.23  Each of 
the cases, and the one brought by Cleveland Wright, has now settled.24  These 
cases have taught me that litigation success is both possible and of enormous 
benefit to those who unquestionably deserve it, but it is also painful, protracted, 
and potentially fleeting. 
In Part II, I discuss the cases of Kirk Odom and Santae Tribble brought 
under the D.C. Act.  Those recent cases offer insight into how two different 
judges approached the difficult remedial questions presented.  They also 
demonstrate how dramatically most statutes undercompensate claimants.  In 
Part III, I describe how I drew data provided by the National Registry of Ex-
onerations, and many other sources, to document which exonerees filed state 
compensation claims and how those claims were decided.  The resulting data 
show the percentages of exonerees who filed claims and were awarded com-
pensation and the costs of such awards.  In Part IV, I analyze aspects of existing 
state compensation statutes.  In Part V, I explore the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.  
In Part VI, I extract design elements of those statutes and draw lessons from 
 
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (July 3, 2012), https://www.law.umich.edu/spe-
cial/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3926 (last updated July 19, 2016) [here-
inafter Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY]; Cleveland Wright, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS 
(Feb. 3, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casede-
tail.aspx?caseid=4365 (last updated July 19, 2016) [hereinafter Wright, NAT’L 
REGISTRY]. 
 20. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-421–425 (West 2017). 
 21. See supra notes 18–19. 
 22. Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Orders D.C. to Pay $13.2 Million in Wrongful FBI Hair 
Conviction Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lo-
cal/public-safety/judge-orders-dc-to-pay-132-million-in-wrongful-fbi-hair-conviction-
case/2016/02/28/da82e178-dcde-11e5-81ae-
7491b9b9e7df_story.html?utm_term=.8e969d83e73c; Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. to Pay 
$9.2 Million in Wrongful Conviction, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/local/crime/judge-orders-dc-to-pay-record-91-million-in-wrongful-
conviction-case/2015/02/27/f54edaa6-beea-11e4-8668-4e7ba8439ca6_story.html. 
 23. Spencer S. Hsu, District to Pay $16.65 Million to Wrongfully Imprisoned Man, 
Attorneys Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lo-
cal/public-safety/district-to-pay-1665-million-to-wrongly-imprisoned-man-attorneys-
say/2015/11/19/2f62fd58-8ecf-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html. 
 24. See supra notes 18–19. 
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the empirical research to propose statutory reforms that are both mindful of 
state interests and more just for exonerees. 
II.  WHAT IS THE VALUE OF A LOST YEAR? 
A.  Kirk Odom 
On February 24, 1981, not far from the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., 
the lives of two young people were changed forever.  At about six in the morn-
ing, S.Y., a white woman, was asleep in her house.25  At the same time, Kirk 
Odom, an 18-year-old African American man, was asleep in the house he 
shared with his mother, step-father, and several siblings, a couple of miles 
away.26  A man entered S.Y.’s dark home, bound and blindfolded her, and then 
sexually assaulted her.27  He stole items from her house but left behind semen 
on her nightgown and pillow, as well as a pubic hair.28 
Despite a very brief opportunity to view the assailant in the dark and un-
der extreme stress, S.Y. assisted a sketch artist in drawing the face of her rap-
ist.29  The resulting drawing was circulated among D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department officers, one of whom saw Mr. Odom walking down the street and 
thought that he might resemble the man depicted in the drawing.30  Ultimately, 
S.Y. made a positive, but incorrect, cross-racial identification of him in a photo 
array, a police lineup, and at trial.31  That, along with the scientifically invalid 
testimony of an FBI hair examiner who stated that Mr. Odom’s hair and the 
pubic hair left at the scene were microscopically similar, was enough convict 
Mr. Odom.32  The man who actually committed this heinous crime was a con-
victed sex offender, not Kirk Odom.33  Over twenty-two years later, at age 
forty, Mr. Odom was released on parole.34  Subsequent DNA testing exoner-
ated Mr. Odom, who received his certificate of actual innocence from a D.C. 
Superior Court judge ten years later, on his fiftieth birthday.35 
Mr. Odom experienced an unspeakable ordeal in the many prisons to 
which he was transferred during his incarceration.  Physical brutality, severe 
emotional suffering, serious illness, and a toxic combination of intense fear and 
unrelieved boredom marked his days, each of which began with the thoughts 
 
 25. Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 
2, at *4–5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015). 
 26. Id. at *4. 
 27. Id. at *3. 
 28. Id. at *3, *13. 
 29. Id. at *3. 
 30. Id. at *4. 
 31. Id. at *4–5. 
 32. Id. at *4. 
 33. Id. at *1. 
 34. Id. at *5. 
 35. Id. at *13. 
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that he should not be where he was, that his life was slipping away from him, 
and that there was nothing he could do about it.36  While incarcerated, he lost 
contact with his daughter who was born two weeks before he was convicted, 
lost his younger brother to a senseless murder, and briefly lost his grip on real-
ity.37 
B.  Santae Tribble 
Early on the morning of July 26, 1978, a taxi driver named John McCor-
mick returned from his shift to his home in a gritty southeast D.C. neighbor-
hood.38  He parked near his home, put his earnings in the trunk of his cab, and 
trudged to the front door of his house.  Before he could get inside, a man wear-
ing a stocking mask fatally shot him in the chest and rifled through his pock-
ets.39  At the same time, 17-year-old Santae Tribble was asleep at his mother’s 
Maryland apartment with relatives and family friends.40  Hours later, a canine 
officer found the mask.41  At Mr. Tribble’s 1980 trial, an FBI hair examiner 
testified that a hair found on that mask matched Mr. Tribble’s.42  A police in-
formant also testified that Mr. Tribble and his co-defendant, Cleveland Wright, 
sold her roommate a .32 caliber handgun – the same type of “Saturday night 
special” gun used in the McCormick shooting – a few days after the murder.43  
She also testified that Mr. Tribble made incriminating statements to her.44 
That evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Tribble, who was sentenced 
to concurrent terms of twenty years to life in prison.45  He was ultimately pa-
roled in 2003, after serving precisely 25 years.46  The police kept the hairs 
found in the stocking mask.47  Using DNA analysis, it was determined that one 
belonged to a dog, and the others did not belong to Mr. Tribble or Mr. Wright.48  
 
 36. Id. at *5–6. 
 37. Id. at *5–7. 
 38. Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super. 
LEXIS 4, at *5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016).  The published opinion in Tribble was 
subsequently modified to correct small factual errors and an arithmetical mistake in the 
calculation of damages.  Tribble v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 2013-CA-003237-
B, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2016). See also Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, 
supra note 19. 
 39. See Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *15; Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, 
supra note 19. 
 40. See generally Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 19. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *15; Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, supra 
note 19. 
 43. Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 19. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *1. 
 46. Id. at *11. 
 47. Id. at *15. 
 48. Tribble, NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 19. 
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The police informant later testified under oath that the gun was sold to her 
roommate prior to the murder, that officers instructed her to change the excul-
patory date of sale in her diary, and that, contrary to trial testimony that the gun 
was lost, she actually provided it to the police.49 
Incarcerated at age 17, prison was harrowing for Mr. Tribble.  He spent 
long periods in solitary confinement, once in restraints for days.50  He found 
temporary relief from boredom, fear, and despair in heroin, but he contracted 
serious diseases as a result.51  Following his release, Mr. Tribble returned to 
the District of Columbia to rebuild his life.52  He found two jobs he enjoyed, 
only to lose both when a vindictive parole officer sabotaged them.53  Depressed 
and discouraged, several parole violations followed before a D.C Superior 
Court judge exonerated him in 2012, 34 years after Mr. McCormick’s slay-
ing.54 
One can read the psychological literature about the effects of wrongful 
conviction55 and prepare a client for trial testimony over and over again, but 
there is something about hearing a man testify about the horrors of incarcera-
tion in the same courthouse in which he was wrongly convicted that can, and 
should, shudder the souls of even the most stoic.  Far worse, to have to testify 
and withstand cross-examination about intensely personal details of prison and 
post-prison life, to hear family members eulogize you in the courtroom, and to 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *10. 
 51. Id. at *46–47. 
 52. Id. at *10–11. 
 53. Id. at *12–13. 
 54. Id. at *15–16. 
 55. Kathryn Campbell & Myriam Denov, The Burden of Innocence: Coping with 
a Wrongful Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 139, 139–64 
(2004); Kathryn Campbell & Myriam Denov, Miscarriages of Justice: The Impact of 
Wrongful Imprisonment, 13 JUST. RES. 5 (2005); Jeffrey Chinn & Ashley Ratliff, “I 
Was Put out the Door with Nothing” – Addressing the Needs of the Exonerated Under 
A Refugee Model, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 405, 405–44 (2009); Mary C. Delaney, Keith A. 
Findley & Sheila Sullivan, Exonerees’ Hardships After Freedom, WIS. LAW., Feb. 
2010, at 18, http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Arti-
cle.aspx?Volume=83&Issue=2&ArticleID=1925#bio; Adrian Grounds, Psychological 
Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment, 46 CANADIAN J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004); Adrian T. Grounds, Understanding the Ef-
fects of Wrongful Imprisonment, 32 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2005); Adina M. Thompson, 
Oscar R. Molina & Lora M. Levett, After Exoneration: An Investigation of Stigma and 
Wrongfully Convicted Persons, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1373 (2012); Leslie Scott, “It Never, 
Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful Incarceration, 5 AM. U. CRIM. L. 
BRIEF 10 (2010); Heather Weigand, Rebuilding a Life: The Wrongfully Convicted and 
Exonerated, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 427 (2009); Saundra D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. 
Cook, Coping with Innocence after Death Row, CONTEXTS, Fall 2008, at 32; Saundra 
D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. Cook, Framing Innocents: The Wrongfully Convicted as 
Victims of State Harm, 53 CRIME, L., & SOC. CHANGE 259 (2010). 
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hear expert witnesses discuss your mental and emotional health and your di-
minished life expectancy in public and with reporters watching, is grueling and 
tortuous.  It takes a particularly strong person to endure this kind of litigation.  
If nothing else, exonerees like Mr. Odom and Mr. Tribble deserve compassion, 
and litigation is not a very compassionate exercise.  But, the D.C. Act, like 
those of several other states, requires essentially a relitigation of the post-con-
viction proceedings, an exercise made necessary when the government is dis-
inclined to consider settlement. 
C.  The D.C. Act 
The D.C. Act56 is, comparatively, a very progressive statute.  Following 
the exoneration of Bradford Brown in 1979 for a murder he did not commit, 
the D.C. City Council exercised its authority under the District of Columbia 
Home Rule Act57 to supplement the pre-existing federal wrongful conviction 
remedy.58  Its aim was “to create a civil cause of action against the District of 
Columbia on behalf of persons who are convicted and subsequently imprisoned 
for offenses which they did not commit.”59 
The Council’s heart was in the right place; it viewed compensation as a 
moral imperative of government.  The Judiciary Committee explained that the 
bill was “[g]rounded upon the principle of fundamental fairness.”60  Because 
unjust imprisonment can occur only because of “governmental error,” the 
Committee stated that “a remedy should be made available by the District of 
 
 56. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-421 (West 2017). 
 57. Id. § 1-201.02. 
 58. In the District of Columbia, the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department investi-
gates violations of the D.C. criminal code.  See id. § 5-133.17.  Criminal defendants are 
tried in the D.C. Superior Court before a superior court judge and jury.  See id. § 16-
705.  Congress, however, determined that prosecutions for most violations of the D.C. 
Code would be conducted “in the name of the United States by the United States attor-
ney for the District of Columbia.”  Id. § 23-101(c); see also In re Crawley, 978 A.2d 
608, 620 (D.C. 2009).  As a result, those wrongly convicted in District of Columbia 
had (before passage of the D.C. Act) and still have an additional remedy against the 
United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2012).  Since 2004, the federal 
wrongful conviction compensation statute has awarded the wrongfully convicted up to 
$50,000 per year of incarceration, or up to $100,000 of incarceration per year on death 
row.  See Stephanie Slifer, How the Wrongfully Convicted Are Compensated for Years 
Lost, CBS NEWS (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:33AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-the-
wrongfully-convicted-are-compensated/.  From 1938 to 2004, the federal statute per-
mitted the award of only $5000 in total for unjust convictions.  28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) 
(amended 2004); see also Alan Vinegrad & Douglas Bloom, Compensating the 
Wrongly Convicted, 238 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Oct. 2007). 
 59. COUNCIL OF D.C., COMM. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT 1 (July 9, 1980) [hereinafter 
D.C. COMM. REPORT]; see also Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 
2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015). 
 60. D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 2; Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, 
at *16. 
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Columbia to compensate the tragic consequences of such errors when they do 
occur.”61 
The cause of action against the District is codified in section 2-421 of the 
D.C. Code, which provides simply that “[a]ny person unjustly convicted of and 
subsequently imprisoned for a criminal offense contained in the District of Co-
lumbia Official Code may present a claim for damages against the District of 
Columbia.”62  The compensation provision is plain: if a judge finds that the 
plaintiff has met the statutory prerequisites, “the judge may award damages.”63 
Rare among compensation schemes, the District of Columbia’s no-fault 
statute is uncapped, and damages are not restricted to post-conviction years 
served in prison.  Indeed, proposals to place limitations on the amount of dam-
ages available under the Act were repeatedly rejected.64  The Council expressly 
wished to avoid “arbitrary” caps that may restrict a claimant from recovering 
an amount warranted for actual suffering under “traditional legal methods of 
assessing damages.”65  Thus, common law tort principles of full compensation 
for loss govern the award of damages under the Act.66  The Council viewed the 
prohibition on punitive damages and the requirement that cases be heard by a 
judge rather than a jury as the devices needed to limit excessive fiscal expo-
sure.67 
From a remedial perspective, the District of Columbia’s full, tort-based 
compensation approach is one of the best in the country.  But, like many older 
statutes, it is not perfect.  It requires separate civil litigation following post-
conviction relief.  There is no provision for prompt interim financial support 
and social services.  There is no attorneys’ fees provision.  There is no specific 
provision for the expungement of the wrongful conviction.  There is no dead-
line for the resolution of these cases.  Nor does it incorporate provisions that 
can ease the financial burden of statutory compensation on the District of Co-
lumbia. 
D.  Odom v. District of Columbia and Tribble v. District of Columbia 
In Odom, the District of Columbia stipulated to liability under the D.C. 
Act.68  After a 6-day trial on damages, Judge Neal Kravitz of the D.C. Superior 
Court awarded Mr. Odom $9,154,500.69  Judge Kravitz recounted Mr. Odom’s 
life story and his experiences in prison and after release, and he considered 
 
 61. D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 2. 
 62. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-421. 
 63. Id. § 2-423. 
 64. D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 9. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 
2, at *25 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015). 
 67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-423; D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 59, at 4. 
 68. Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *2. 
 69. Id. at *57. 
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expert testimony on his psychological and medical harm.70  He detailed Mr. 
Odom’s 30 prison transfers, separation from his friends and family, and the 
particular fear of violence (subsequently realized) as a person convicted of 
rape.71  Judge Kravitz did what the legislative history of the Act said he should 
do – assess damages based on traditional tort principles. 
Judge Kravitz awarded Mr. Odom $1000 per day for each day of impris-
onment, $250 per day for each day on parole, and $200 per day for each day 
between his exoneration and the trial.72  The court initially denied Mr. Odom’s 
request for future damages experienced after the date of trial, but following a 
motion for reconsideration, the court decided to award Mr. Odom an additional 
$500,000 for post-trial damages.73  Judge Kravitz denied Mr. Odom’s request 
for lost wages on the ground that the wages were speculative.74  The District of 
Columbia filed an appeal and the case later settled, nearly three years after it 
was filed.75 
In Tribble, the District of Columbia belatedly conceded liability at trial.76  
D.C. Superior Court Judge John M. Mott heard testimony from Mr. Tribble, 
his son, his friends, and expert witnesses.77  Without contradiction, those wit-
nesses testified at length about the medical and psychological harm caused by 
his wrongful imprisonment.78  Judge Mott followed Judge Kravitz’s interpre-
tation of the Act and held that it required the award of full compensatory re-
lief.79  He further rejected the testimony of the District of Columbia’s only 
witness, an economist, who testified that Mr. Tribble suffered no economic loss 
because, had he not been imprisoned, his consumption would have exceeded 
his income.80  Judge Mott awarded Mr. Tribble $400,000 per year in damages 
for post-conviction time in prison,  $100,000 per year in post-release damages, 
future medical expenses, and lost wages.81 
 
 70. See generally id. 
 71. Id. at *8–16. 
 72. Id. at *56–57.  The opinion does not explain how the court arrived at those 
numbers. 
 73. Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013 CA 3239, slip op. at 8, 9 (D.C. Super. 
Ct. July 22, 2015).      
 74. Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *48–51. 
 75. Id. at *26. 
 76. Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super. 
LEXIS 4, at *17 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016). 
 77. Id. at *7, *18. 
 78. Id. at *12. 
 79. Id. at *13–15.  The courts in Odom and Tribble held that the compensable 
period begins on the date of conviction, not the date of pre-trial detention or the date of 
sentencing.  Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *44–46; Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. 
LEXIS 4, at *20–21. 
 80. Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *19. 
 81. Id. at *66.  As with Odom, the court did not explain the basis for its choice of 
those numbers. 
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Odom and Tribble were triumphs of a progressive compensation statute.  
The damage awards in Odom and Tribble were significantly higher, even ac-
counting for inflation, than that of the court’s only other decision under the Act 
– the 1985 judgment in Brown v. District of Columbia.82  It is beyond the scope 
of this Article to determine whether awards in these types of cases have in-
creased over time.  But, the very small D.C. sample accords with an intuition 
that, as American society has become more familiar with wrongful convictions 
and the stories of those who have experienced it, greater value may be placed 
on their pain and suffering.  The evolving social understanding of just compen-
sation in this context warrants the reexamination of state statutes with caps, 
particularly those that have been in place for some time and that are increas-
ingly out of step with this understanding. 
E.  Odom and Tribble and the Connecticut Epilogue 
Not long after the ink on the judgment in Odom was dry, the D.C. Attor-
ney General proposed legislation which would have had the effects of nullify-
ing that verdict and of precluding the claims under the Act made by Santae 
Tribble and Cleveland Wright.83  That legislation is bottled up in the Council’s 
Judiciary Committee,84 but it offers a cautionary tale to those who view com-
pensation statutes as the best way to ensure that the wrongfully convicted may 
seek relief for the terrible injuries they suffer.  These statutes could be victims 
of their success.  The wrongfully convicted might be unjustly punished twice 
– once by the criminal jury and again by the legislature, which repeals or limits 
the civil remedies they have. 
So far, that has not happened in the District of Columbia,85 but it did hap-
pen in Connecticut, which was 1 of just 6 states without compensation caps.  
 
 82. The wrongful conviction of Bradford Brown prompted passage of the D.C. 
Act.  See Brown v. District of Columbia, No. 11595-81 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 12, 1985).  
The Superior Court awarded Mr. Brown $325,000 for an unjust imprisonment lasting 
over 3 years.  Id. at 30.  The judges in Odom and Tribble awarded post-release damages, 
while Judge Urbina did not in Brown.  Id.; Tribble, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *68–
70; Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *43, *51–57. 
 83. In the District of Columbia, the Attorney General has the authority to propose 
legislation through the City Council.  B21-0150 – Unjust Imprisonment Amendment 
Act of 2015, COUNCIL OF THE D.C. (2015), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Legislation/B21-
0150?FromSearchResults=true.  His proposal, B21-0150, which is expressly retroac-
tive, would impose an annual cap of $50,000 per year of incarceration, unless the plain-
tiff has received a settlement or obtained a judgment against the United States, in which 
case the D.C. remedy is offset dollar by dollar.  Id. 
 84. Id.  See Irvin B. Nathan, Opinion, D.C. Needs to Revise Its Wrongful-Convic-
tion Law, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dc-
needs-to-revise-its-wrongful-conviction-law/2016/09/23/37faa1e4-7f94-11e6-8d0c-
fb6c00c90481_story.html?utm_term=.a2e36fb23708 (former D.C. Attorney General 
argues for substantial limitations on D.C. Unjust Imprisonment Law). 
 85. On April 10, 2017, the Mayor of the District of Columbia proposed the FY 
2018 Budget Support Act of 2017, B22-244, which included amendments to the Act 
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In Connecticut, claimants were eligible to receive compensation if their con-
victions were vacated “on grounds of innocence, or the complaint or infor-
mation [was] dismissed on a ground consistent with innocence.”86  Hearings 
before the Claims Commissioner, the person empowered under Connecticut 
law to determine eligibility and award damages, permitted the claimant to offer 
evidence of categories of damages that reflected the legislature’s intention that 
the award be fully compensatory.87 
On January 15, 2016, the Connecticut Claims Commissioner awarded 
$4.2 million each to 4 men whose convictions of a gang-related murder were 
vacated on the ground that the prosecutor sponsored false testimony of a key 
government witness.88  Each was imprisoned for about 17 years; the Commis-
sioner awarded each $2.4 million for loss of liberty and enjoyment of life, $1.1 
million for lost wages, $200,000 for loss of reputation, $100,000 for physical 
and mental injury, and $200,000 for attorneys’ fees and costs.89  The award 
was further enhanced by $200,000 for governmental “misconduct.”90  Consid-
erable controversy surrounded this award for two reasons.91 
First, the convictions of the 4 men were vacated on grounds of prosecu-
torial misconduct, not factual innocence.92  Second, the amount of the awards 
to men described in the press as gang members generated concern.93  The re-
sulting legislation addresses both issues but in an unusual way.  The amended 
statute widens the eligibility criteria by explicitly permitting recovery to those 
whose criminal complaint or indictment was dismissed on the grounds of an 
act or omission “that constitutes malfeasance or other serious misconduct” of 
 
that would set compensation at $200,000 per year of unjust imprisonment and $40,000 
per year for each year served on parole, on probation, or as a registered sex offender.  
FY 2018 Budget Support Act of 2017, B22-244, Subtit. C, § 1022. 
 86. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(a)(2) (amended 2016). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Mark Pazniokas, Claims Commissioner Resigns Amid Controversy, CT 
MIRROR (Feb. 19, 2016), http://ctmirror.org/2016/02/19/claims-commissioner-resigns-
amid-controversy. 
 89. Memorandum of Decision: Wrongful Incarceration at 7–8, Claims of Carlos 
Ashe et al. (Conn. Claims Comm’r Jan. 15, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Claim of Carlos Ashe].  The award for loss of liberty, reputation, and physical and 
mental injury, totaling $2.7 million, comes to nearly $160,000 per year of incarceration, 
a metric less than half of that awarded in Odom and Tribble.  Id. 
 90. Id. at 8. 
 91. CT Needs New Rules, Oversight of Wrongful Conviction Awards, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Feb. 24, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.courant.com/opinion/editorials/hc-
ed-claims-commish-needs-review-20160223-story.html; Pazniokas, supra note 88; 
Max Reiss, Change Urged After Controversial Wrongful Conviction Payments, NBC 
CONN. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Change-Urged-
After-Controversial-Wrongful-Conviction-Payments-369507052.html. 
 92. See Claim of Carlos Ashe, supra note 89.  Each of the 4 is listed in the Regis-
try. 
 93. See sources cited supra note 91. 
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a state officer or employee.94  It narrows the scope of compensation by limiting 
awards to between one and two times the median state household income95 and 
permitting the Claims Commissioner to increase or decrease that award by 25% 
based on relevant factors.96  If that amount exceeds $20,000, or if the claimant 
seeks review, the Connecticut General Assembly has 45 days to deny, confirm, 
or modify the award.97  The new Connecticut statute also makes one additional, 
worrisome change.  Previously, acceptance of state compensation did not pre-
clude other claims, like federal civil rights claims against other state actors.  
Now, award of compensation under the statute requires the claimant to release 
such claims.98 
Table 1 shows that Connecticut’s overall payments and average payment 
per exoneree were among the highest in the nation.99  Connecticut paid ex-
onerees significantly more than California and Illinois combined, which to-
gether had almost 18 times as many exonerees who experienced time in prison.  
That underscores California’s and Illinois’s parsimony, not Connecticut’s gen-
erosity.  But more troubling is that Connecticut’s retrenchment appears to be 
the first of its kind.  Since 1913, states have slowly adopted more compensation 
statutes and even more slowly increased the compensation permitted by 
them.100 
Perhaps Connecticut is a one-off reversal of that progressive trend ex-
plained by an idiosyncratic reaction to an unpopular Claims Commissioner and 
awards to apparently disliked exonerees.  But one wonders whether other pro-
gressive states hit by large damages verdicts, or states with more exonerees 
than Connecticut, might similarly seek to limit those statutes.101  The argument 
for such limitation must necessarily turn on concerns about cost.  It is worth, 
then, examining how costly these statutes have actually been. 
 
 94. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(a)(2) (West 2017). 
 95. The median state household annual income in 2014 was $70,112.  Kirby G. 
Posey, Household Income: 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2016), https://www.cen-
sus.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/acsbr15-02.pdf. 
 96. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(d)(2). 
 97. Id. § 54-102uu(d)(1) (stating the Assembly can modify the award to any 
amount it “deems just and reasonable”). 
 98. Id. § 54-102uu(g).  Whether a state, by statute, can preclude state compensa-
tion recipients from the filing of federal civil rights claims is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 99. Robert J. Norris, Exoneree Compensation: Current Policies and Future Out-
look, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 
289, 294–95 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See generally supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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III.  THE BIG PICTURE 
A.  Coverage of State Compensation Statutes 
Over time, the number of states adopting compensation statutes for 
wrongful imprisonment has grown and, with the District of Columbia, has now 
reached 33.102  The adoption of such statutes has accelerated since the first 
DNA exoneration in 1989.103  Nevertheless, the absence of universal national 
coverage of such statutes is troubling.  Eighteen states (and Guam and Puerto 
Rico) fail to offer statutory redress for wrongful convictions.  How many ex-
onerees fall within that gap? 
The National Registry of Exonerations, a project of the University of Cal-
ifornia, Irvine, Newkirk Center for Science & Society, the University of Mich-
igan Law School, and the Michigan State University College of Law, maintains 
a database of individuals convicted of crimes but later exonerated based on new 
evidence of innocence since 1989.104  As of March 1, 2017, the cut-off date for 
this analysis, there were 2000 listed exonerations.105  That averages about 71 
per year for the 28 years covered by the Registry.106  The Registry identifies 
each exoneree by state of conviction.107 
For purposes of determining the current breadth of coverage of state com-
pensation statutes, I make an important counterfactual assumption.  I assume 
that all 1900 individuals wrongly convicted in a state court since 1989 were 
actually exonerated on March 1, 2017, rather than on the actual date of exon-
eration.  How many were unjustly convicted in a state that now has a compen-
sation statute? 
 
 102. Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.in-
nocenceproject.org/compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017). 
 103. Norris, supra note 99, at 294–95; Owens & Griffiths, supra note 2, at 1286–
87. 
 104. About the Registry, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (last visited Mar. 20, 
2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx. 
 105. Id. 
 106. The number of exonerations, however, has steadily increased over time.  Ex-
onerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-
Year.aspx.  The year 2016 saw a record number of exonerations: 166.  Exonerations in 
2016, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS 1 (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonera-
tions_in_2016.pdf. 
 107. Detailed View, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Mar. 
1, 2017) [hereinafter COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY].  Of the 2000 exonerated individu-
als, 100 were convicted in a federal or military court.  Id.  These individuals may be 
entitled to compensation under the federal wrongful conviction statute.  28 U.S.C. §§ 
1495, 2513 (2012).  Thus, the Registry shows that 1900 persons were wrongly con-
victed in a state or territorial court.  COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra. 
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The results are reflected in Table 1.  Column B of the Table indicates 
whether the state now has a compensation statute and the year of its enact-
ment.108  Column C is the number of exonerated individuals wrongly convicted 
in a state court of that state since 1989.  In total, 1674 of 1900 exonerees, or 
88.1%, were convicted in states or territories that now have a statute.  The Reg-
istry lists 226 of 1900 exonerees convicted in the 18 states and 2 territories 
(Guam and Puerto Rico) without statutes.109  Put differently, while only about 
60% of the states and territories have statutes, those states were home, at the 
time of conviction, to nearly 90% of the listed exonerees on the Registry.110 
That result accords with a reasonable intuition that states with more 
wrongful convictions are more likely, perhaps because of that experience, to 
have a compensation statute.111  Indeed, this intuition is confirmed by recent 
analysis.  In 2012, political scientists Michael Leo Owens and Elizabeth Grif-
fiths examined the 289 DNA exonerations identified at that point by the Inno-
cence Project.112  They found that “the mean number of exonerations in states 
with compensation laws is significantly larger . . . than the mean number of 
exonerations in states that have failed to enact a compensation statute.”113  Ow-
ens and Griffiths then hypothesized why this might be and ran a series of sta-
tistical analyses to test the influence of interest group pressure, punitive re-
gimes, and government ideology.114  They found that only interest group pres-
sure, which they measured to include the number of exonerations and the pres-
ence of an Innocence Project in the state, was positively associated with the 
presence of a state compensation statute.115 
 
 108. I included Michigan, even though its new statute took effect after March 1, 
2017. 
 109. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 110. The Registry further identifies exonerated individuals who were not incarcer-
ated in prison – including those remanded to a mental hospital, sentenced to community 
service, fined, with suspended licenses, not sentenced at all, who received probation, 
or whose sentences were unknown.  Id.  Column D of Table 1 identifies the number of 
incarcerated exonerees per state.  See infra Table 1.  Of the 1900 state or territorial 
exonerees, 1719 were incarcerated in a jail or prison.  See infra Table 1.  Of those, 
1509, or 87.8%, were convicted in a state that, as of March 1, 2017, has a state com-
pensation statute.  See infra Table 1. 
 111. Norris, supra note 99, at 297 (finding correlation between the number of ex-
onerations and the existence of a state compensation statute).  However, Professor Nor-
ris believes that “the sociocultural and political environments in which reform efforts 
take place,” particularly the intensity of innocence advocacy and media attention on 
particular cases, better explains the diffusion of compensation statutes.  Id. at 295–99. 
 112. Owens & Griffiths, supra note 2, at 1283.  Exonerations following DNA anal-
ysis are among the exonerations listed in the Registry.  COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, 
supra note 107. 
 113. Owens & Griffiths, supra note 2, at 1308, 1310 fig.2B. 
 114. Id. at 1289. 
 115. Id. at 1321.  The authors were careful not to infer causation from this relation-
ship. 
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A look generally at all exonerations, rather than just DNA exonerations, 
seems consistent with this conclusion.  The 4 states with the largest number of 
exonerees as of March 1, 2017 – Texas (309), New York (224), Illinois (184), 
and California (173) – have statutes.116  Eleven of the 18 states without statutes 
have 8 or fewer exonerees.117  There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general 
finding.  As explained, the District of Columbia enacted its compensation stat-
ute after only 1 wrongful conviction.  Several states with a compensation stat-
ute have few exonerees: Colorado (7), Hawaii (3), Maine (2), Montana (9), 
New Hampshire (1), and Vermont (1).118  At the same time, Pennsylvania (60), 
Georgia (29), and Indiana (24) are the states with the largest number of ex-
onerees without compensation statutes.119 
That is not to say that universal coverage is an unworthy goal.  Every state 
should have a no-fault compensation statute.  The failure of the 18 states to 
have one has left scores of wrongly convicted persons without the possibility 
of state statutory redress.  However, it does suggest how pro-compensation ad-
vocates might prioritize their resources.  Assuming that the relative numbers 
of exonerations among states remain stable over time, seeking reform of exist-
ing weak statutes, particularly in states with large numbers of exonerees, could 
help more people than expanding the number of states with a compensation 
statute, especially states with low numbers of exonerees.120 
B.  Use and Costs of State Compensation Statutes 
To be sure, the wrongfully incarcerated suffer grievously, and those pro-
found injuries have prompted most states to impose compensation caps for fear 
that awards based on a D.C.-like tort damage statute would be unpredictably 
higher.  It is worth testing the source of that worry by asking how much these 
statutes actually cost.  The answer is far less than one might reasonably think, 
amounting to a tiny percentage of state corrections budgets. 
 
 116. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 117. Alaska (8), Arkansas (6), Delaware (2), Idaho (2), Kansas (7), New Mexico 
(6), North Dakota (2), Rhode Island (5), South Carolina (7), South Dakota (4), and 
Wyoming (3).  Id.  Of the 10 states with the largest per capita numbers of exonerations 
from 1989 to 2013, only Wyoming lacks a compensation statute.  See Exonerations in 
2013, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS 20 (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonera-
tions_in_2013_Report.pdf. 
 118. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Of course, advocates should seize on well-publicized wrongful convictions, 
which sometimes get more state-wide press coverage when they are rare, to press for 
state compensation statutes; this recently happened in Alaska.  See, e.g., Megan Edge, 
New Bill Would Give Payouts to Wrongfully Convicted Alaskans, ALASKA DISPATCH 
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.adn.com/crime-justice/article/exonerated-alaskans-
could-reap-financial-benefits/2016/02/06/ (last updated Sept. 30, 2016) (sponsor of 
Alaska proposal inspired by wrongful convictions in the Fairbanks Four case). 
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1.  The Data Collection Process 
To calculate these costs, I again relied on the data provided in the National 
Registry of Exonerations.  As noted in Table 1, as of March 1, 2017, the Reg-
istry shows that 1674 individuals were convicted of crimes in state courts in 
states that today have compensation statutes.  Of those, 165 were not incarcer-
ated and would not be eligible for compensation under any state statute.121  The 
resulting total, 1509, listed by state, is found in Column D of Table 1.  The task 
has been to record who among this group has been awarded compensation and 
how much was received. 
Academic studies and some detailed press reports have documented the 
amounts paid to exonerees under particular state compensation statutes.122  A 
number of states publish state compensation awards, decisions, and denials 
online.  The Registry has researched state statutory and other forms of com-
pensation for a substantial number of exonerees.123  It has summarized that 
information within the public narrative descriptions associated with each ex-
oneree.124  The Innocence Project has documented compensation awards in 
some cases involving DNA exonerations and provided that data to me.  Witness 
to Innocence, which focuses on death penalty cases, has done the same. 
In addition, I received data from a number of states following FOIA or 
other records requests.  Government personnel in those states have been excep-
tionally helpful in gathering and providing me that information and generous 
with their time in responding to follow-up inquiries.  I have also reviewed press 
reporting, obtained information on public databases, court records, and judicial 
opinions, and have received data from practicing attorneys.  In sum, I have 
reasonably precise data from all of the 33 jurisdictions with state compensation 
statutes. 
While I am confident that I obtained substantially complete data on 
awards125 and denials, determining precisely which exonerees did not file 
 
 121. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.  These individuals are recorded 
as having zero time lost in the Registry.  Id. 
 122. See, e.g., THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, 
BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, CRIMINAL (IN)JUSTICE: A COST ANALYSIS OF WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS, ERRORS, AND FAILED PROSECUTIONS IN CALIFORNIA’S CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2015); Dan Glaun, Massachusetts Has Paid $8.34 Million Under 
Wrongful Conviction Compensation Law, MASSLIVE (Aug. 31, 2016, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/08/massachu-
setts_has_paid_834_mil.html (last updated Aug. 31, 2016, 7:31 AM); Johnathan Silver 
& Lindsay Carbonell, Wrongful Convictions Have Cost Texans More Than $93 Million, 
TEX. TRIB. (June 24, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastrib-
une.org/2016/06/24/wrongful-convictions-cost-texans-over-93-million/. 
 123. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 124. Id. 
 125. I very seldom encountered a state award of compensation in an undisclosed 
amount.  I coded those as a grant but did not speculate on the amount.  At least 2 states 
that lack a statute, Arkansas and Georgia, had made modest awards legislatively or 
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claims at all is clearer in some states than others.  However, as noted, wrongful 
conviction compensation has been the subject of detailed academic study and 
press reporting, based on analysis of government documents, in several states, 
including California, Massachusetts, and Texas.  Other states, such as Ala-
bama, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, and Wiscon-
sin, maintain comprehensive databases or reports of claims.  The absence of a 
claim made by an exoneree in those materials raises a very strong inference 
that no claim was made.  For many other states, conversations with government 
officials and reviews of press reporting allowed similarly strong inferences to 
be made.  At bottom, while the number of non-filers may be overstated, any 
variation is likely to be modest. 
At the same time, this is not a static process.  Additions are made to the 
Registry frequently – both newly exonerated individuals and recently discov-
ered exonerees of the past.  New administrative claims or lawsuits are filed, 
and existing claims are decided.  As a result, I tagged people whose relatively 
recent exoneration dates lie within the applicable statute of limitations as 
“premature” when I found no evidence of a claim being filed.  For those indi-
viduals, filing remains possible as of the time of this writing.  When I had de-
finitive information or a strong suspicion that a claim was filed, but undecided, 
I labeled the individual as “pending.” 
2.  Data Analysis 
The result of this research is shown in Table 1.  Column B indicates 
whether the state listed in Column A has a compensation statute and, if so, 
when it was originally adopted.  Starting with the number of exonerees listed 
in the National Registry of Exonerations for each state with a statute (Column 
C), I set aside those the Registry showed as serving no time in prison, leaving 
the number of individuals I call “incarcerated exonerees” in Column D.  Be-
cause each statute requires individuals to have been imprisoned to award com-
pensation, I presumed that those who did not serve time did not file a claim. 
Non-filing incarcerated exonerees fall into 2 categories.  Column E lists 
the number of relatively new “premature” exonerees, which total 236, who 
have not filed but still have time to file claims.126  Column F states the number 
 
through state claims processes.  I excluded those awards because the state did not have 
a statute. 
 126. Over half of those “premature” claims are in Michigan and Texas.  Michigan 
very recently passed a compensation law.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1751–
691.1757 (West 2017).  Because it does not explicitly preclude those exonerated prior 
to the effective date of the statute from filing a claim, I coded each previously incarcer-
ated Michigan exoneree as “premature.”  In addition, Texas has a large number of ex-
onerees in this category because many people in Harris County were recently deter-
mined to be wrongly convicted on drug offenses based on inaccurate field tests of sus-
picious substances.  See Lise Olsen & Anita Hassan, 298 Wrongful Drug Convictions 
Identified in Ongoing Audit, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 16, 2016), 
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/298-wrongful-
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of incarcerated exonerees (576) who appear not to have filed a claim and who 
cannot do so due to the statute of limitations.  As shown at the bottom of Col-
umn G, and discussed below, 38.17% of the exonerated persons in states with 
compensation statutes did not file a claim.  That number will rise when any 
person coded as “premature” does not file within the applicable statute of lim-
itations.  When considering all exonerees, including those convicted in states 
without statutes, the percentage of non-filing increases to over 45%. 
Incarcerated exonerees who did file a claim for compensation under the 
state statute (listed by state in Column H) fall into three categories.  Column I 
lists the number of persons who filed claims and were awarded compensa-
tion.127  That total is 523 and will rise if premature cases are filed and paid and 
when claimants prevail in pending cases.  Column K states the number of per-
sons who filed claims and were denied compensation.128  The total is 109 and 
 
drug-convictions-identified-in-8382474.php.  Because most of these exonerees were 
incarcerated rather briefly, I would expect that few will file for compensation.  In ad-
dition, for some states, it is difficult to determine whether claims are filed before they 
are decided.  It is possible that a number of claims coded as “premature” are actually 
“pending.” 
 127. Some exonerees have received compensation by act of the state legislature, 
typically in the absence of an existing state statute.  I have included those, nevertheless, 
in the count of claims granted in states now with statutes so as not to understate state 
costs.  In addition, there are exonerees who are awarded damages but have not received 
payment, frequently because of state budgetary issues.  This is particularly true in Illi-
nois.  See infra note 237.  Nonetheless, I counted a claim as granted even if not paid. 
 128. Table 1 shows that 109 claims, or 15.6%, were denied.  See infra Table 1.  It 
is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze why a state would deny a claim for com-
pensation by someone listed on the Registry as an exoneree, but a substantial number 
were denied because the claimant failed to show by a preponderance or clear and con-
vincing evidence that he or she was actually innocent of the crime for which he or she 
was wrongly convicted.  This happens with some frequency.  For example, in Califor-
nia, the claimant must prove that “the crime with which he or she was charged was 
either not committed at all, or, if committed, was not committed by him or her.”  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 4903(a) (West 2017).  Of 23 claims denied in California, my research 
found that 19 were denied, at least in part, on the ground that the claimant failed to 
satisfy the statutory innocence standard.  It is more difficult to make a similar assess-
ment for New York, the state with the highest number of denied claims (39) because of 
the lack of availability of orders denying some of those claims. 
  The reason why a person may be listed in the National Registry of Exonera-
tions but fails to show innocence for compensation lies in differences between state 
statutory requirements, the burden on the claimant to establish them, and the definition 
of “exoneration” used by the National Registry: 
 
A person has been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a crime and later 
was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or 
agency with the authority to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of all the 
consequences of the criminal conviction by a government official or body with 
the authority to take that action.  The official action may be: (i) a complete 
pardon by a governor or other competent authority, whether or not the pardon 
is designated as based on innocence; (ii) an acquittal of all charges factually 
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will rise as well.  Column L notes the number of persons, now 65, who filed 
claims that remain pending for decision. 
Additional columns set forth data that provide a basis for cross-state com-
parison.  Column G calculates the percentage of incarcerated exonerees listed 
in the Registry who did not file for compensation.129  For states with more than 
5 exonerees, Mississippi had the lowest percentage of non-filers (12.5%), while 
Montana had the highest (100%).  Large percentages of non-filers within a state 
suggest a structural or statutory barrier that must be addressed, as discussed 
below. 
Column J identifies the percentage of filing incarcerated exonerees who 
received an award.130  In theory, any exoneree listed on the Registry who seeks 
state compensation should be awarded it.  In reality, the percentage of granted 
claims is just over 75%.  That number, however, would increase as pending 
claims are decided in the exoneree’s favor.  States with relatively low grant 
rates with few pending claims, such as California and Iowa, raise obvious ques-
tions.131  As noted, the California Crime Victim Compensation Board has ap-
plied the state statute’s showing of innocence requirement to deny the claims 
of nineteen exonerees.  Iowa has a much smaller sample size, but one claim 
 
related to the crime for which the person was originally convicted; or (iii) a 
dismissal of all charges related to the crime for which the person was originally 
convicted, by a court or by a prosecutor with the authority to enter that dismis-
sal.  The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result, at least in 
part, of evidence of innocence that either (i) was not presented at the trial at 
which the person was convicted; or (ii) if the person pled guilty, was not known 
to the defendant and the defense attorney, and to the court, at the time the plea 
was entered.  The evidence of innocence need not be an explicit basis for the 
official action that exonerated the person. 
 
Glossary, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exon-
eration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).  Depending on how a state 
statute like California’s is applied in practice, the more forgiving language of the Reg-
istry, along with the statute’s placement of the burden of proof on the exoneree rather 
than the government, can lead to disqualified exonerees.  See Kahn, supra note 11, at 
125–26 (noting that statutes should place burden on the government to prove guilt ra-
ther than on the exoneree to again prove innocence or present evidence consistent with 
innocence). 
 129. Column G is the result of dividing the number of non-filing incarcerated ex-
onerees (Column F) by the total number of incarcerated exonerees in the state. See infra 
Table 1. 
 130. Column J is the result of dividing the number of claims granted to incarcerated 
exonerees (Column I) by the number of claims made (Column H).  See infra Table 1.  
The number of claims made includes pending claims which, when decided, will change 
the results. 
 131. Washington, for example, has a low award rate, but a number of pending 
claims, approval of which would increase that rate. 
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was denied by court on the same ground,132 and another was denied on the 
ground that the state statute precludes those who pled guilty from compensa-
tion.133 
Column M shows the percentage of incarcerated exonerees in each state 
with a compensation statute who received an award.134  A low percentage could 
have, in part, a worrisome explanation, like substantial non-filings and denials.  
Or, it could be explained by innocent factors, such as high numbers of prema-
ture or pending claims.  However, at the time of this writing, only just over 
one-third – 34.7% – of incarcerated exonerees from states with statutes re-
ceived compensation.  That number drops to 30.4% when accounting for in-
carcerated exonerees from all states and territories.135 
As described above, I have collected state statutory compensation data for 
each individual wrongly convicted in a state court who is listed on the Registry.  
Adding those awards together is reflected in Column N.  Column N lists the 
amounts paid by each state that currently has a compensation statute.136  The 
total amount paid was $408.4 million, which, over the 28 years covered by the 
Registry, amounts to an average of just $14.6 million per year nationally.137 
Column O lists the average amount paid pursuant to state compensation 
statutes to each incarcerated exoneree (whether or not the exoneree sought 
compensation).  That average ranges dramatically, from under $8000 per ex-
oneree in Wisconsin, to over $2 million per exoneree in Connecticut and the 
District of Columbia.  The national average is $270,669.   Including exonerees 
in states without statutes, that average amount drops to $237,741.46 per ex-
oneree. 
Column P states the number of years lost to wrongful conviction in each 
state as calculated by the Registry.  Column Q divides the total amount paid by 
 
 132. Smith v. State, 845 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Iowa 2014).  See also State v. DeSimone, 
839 N.W.2d 660, 673 (Iowa 2013) (reversing and remanding finding of innocence for 
review of broader record, including prior trial testimony). 
 133. Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 450–51 (Iowa 2016). 
 134. Column M is the result of dividing the number of claims awarded (Column I) 
by the number of incarcerated exonerees (Column D).  See infra Table 1. 
 135. That number omits a very small number of exonerees who received a legisla-
tive award or compensation through a general state claims program in states without a 
wrongful conviction compensation statute. 
 136. The total in Texas includes annuity payments made through June, 2016.  I have 
also included in the Illinois costs all awards made, even though, as a result of budgetary 
deadlock, many recent exonerees have yet to be paid. 
 137. On rare occasions, I have found state wrongful conviction compensation pay-
ments for persons not on the Registry.  I have excluded those from the cost total.  A 
small number of states reported amounts of attorneys’ fees or costs awarded.  Because 
that money is not paid to the claimant, and because the data are not uniformly available, 
I have omitted including it in the cost figures.  Doing so undercounts the costs of these 
statutes to the states. 
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those number of years to obtain a per-year amount for each state with a stat-
ute.138  The average amount paid per year lost to wrongful incarceration ranges 
enormously from $1112.36 in Wisconsin to $183,584.91 in Connecticut.  Put 
differently, the value the state assigns to a year of lost liberty is 165 times 
higher in Connecticut than in Wisconsin.  The overall average amount received 
per incarcerated exoneree per year (whether he or she filed or not) in states that 
now have statutes is $26,846.31; nationally (counting states without statutes), 
the annual average is $23,701.03.  That figure is lower than the 2017 poverty 
rate for a family of four and significantly less than half of the 2015 national 
median household income.139 
I do make an important assumption that understates the cost of these stat-
utes.  I do not consider the costs of non-monetary relief, such as social services, 
tuition assistance, and attorneys’ fees.  I generally have no basis for monetizing 
most of those forms of relief, but those costs are likely to be reasonably modest.  
The marginal cost of providing an exoneree vocational training in a state-oper-
ated program or free or reduced cost education at a state college, valuable as 
they are, is likely to be relatively small.  Nor do I account for reimbursements 
for court costs, fees, and other expenses incurred during the wrongful convic-
tion, or for the governmental costs in processing, deciding, or administering 
these claims. 
States are understandably concerned about the potential costs of progres-
sive wrongful conviction compensation statutes.  But, when the historical rec-
ord is viewed nationally and over time, the gravity of these concerns fades.  Of 
course, payments will trend upward as currently pending or premature cases 
are resolved in the future.  The reality, however, is that the amount paid nation-
ally to a surprisingly small percentage of exonerees over the last 28 years is 
remarkably modest.  And, the average amount paid per year per exoneree is 
roughly tantamount to a low-wage job, effectively awarding little or nothing 
for loss of liberty.  Just as striking is the unfairness inherent in the extraordinary 
 
 138. This figure will in large part be driven by the statutory metric for compensation 
discussed infra Part IV.A.  Admittedly, there is a bit of an apples-to-oranges element 
in this analysis.  As will be discussed below, some states explicitly include in their 
calculations proven lost wages, while others do not.  And some include post-release 
damages, while most do not.  I have included the total of each award, regardless of 
remedial category, in my cost figures.  Those costs do not, then, reflect compensation 
only for the loss of liberty while incarcerated.  This means that the average paid per lost 
year amount in Column Q is overstated in those states.  See infra Table 1. 
 139. Poverty Guidelines: U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines Used to Determine Fi-
nancial Eligibility for Certain Federal Programs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
OFF. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-
guidelines (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) ($24,600 is the poverty line for a family of four); 
Real Median Household Income in the United States, FRED ECON. DATA, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA672N (last updated Sept. 13, 2016) 
($56,516 is the median household income for 2015).  Do note that these figures concern 
only state statutory compensation and do not consider any additional judgments or set-
tlements in federal civil rights or tort claims. 
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variations among states; the fortuity of one’s state of wrongful conviction 
makes an enormous difference. 
Further, comparing the costs of these statutes with state corrections budg-
ets is illuminating.  Determining the cost of incarcerating individuals in the 
United States is an extremely difficult exercise and requires an analysis of more 
than just each state’s published corrections budget.  The Vera Institute of Jus-
tice attempted to do that in 2012.140  In its study, researchers obtained data from 
forty participating states and found that the actual price to taxpayers in those 
states of incarceration was $39 billion in fiscal year 2010.141 
Similarly, in July 2014, the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics published its Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts for 2010.142  
Looking only at state direct and capital outlay expenditures, thereby excluding 
the very substantial expenditures by local and municipal governments and the 
costs found by the Vera Institute to be excluded from budgets, the total expend-
itures by states on corrections in 2010 was just over $46 billion.143  Taking my 
annual cost estimate and dividing it by the most recent 2010 corrections statis-
tics, the cost of compensating the wrongly convicted under state statutes is be-
tween 0.03% and 0.035% of corrections expenditures. 
This is true on a state level as well.  Let’s take as an example Ohio, a 
reasonably generous state with a relatively low number of non-filers, few prem-
ature claims, few pending claims, and a high percentage of claims awarded.  
Ohio’s statute conveniently dates to 1989, and the state maintains comprehen-
sive claims data.  I have high confidence in my cost calculation of $21.3 million 
spent on Ohio statutory compensation, or an average of $760,986 per year.  By 
comparison, the budget for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correc-
tion for fiscal year 2016 is $1,666,729,709.144  The annual cost of compensating 
Ohio’s wrongly convicted is 0.0457% of its corrections budget. 
Naturally, in time, some claimants with premature claims will file and be 
awarded compensation, and some pending claims will be granted as well.  It is 
also true that, if nothing were to change, the annual costs of these statutes 
would likely increase over time.  One can reasonably project into the future 
 
 140. Christian Henrichson & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Prisons: What Incarcer-
ation Costs Taxpayers, VERA INST. JUST. (Jan. 2012), http://archive.vera.org/sites/de-
fault/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf (last up-
dated July 20, 2012). 
 141. Id. at 6. 
 142. Tracey Kyckelhahn, Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 2010 – 
Final, BUREAU JUST. STATS. (July 1, 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbde-
tail&iid=5049. 
 143. It is true that the costs of exoneration statutes apply only to those states that 
have them.  It is fair to compare total state corrections expenditures of all states because 
the costs to states without compensation statutes was $0.  Henrichson & Delaney, supra 
note 140. 
 144. OHIO DEP’T REHABILITATION & CORRECTION (July 2016), 
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=MX_xCeS-dYE%3D&portalid=0. 
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that a higher percentage of claims will be filed in states that have adopted stat-
utes since 1989.  The number of exonerees each year has also generally risen 
over time.145  But, these statistics make it very difficult to take seriously any 
argument that, viewed as a whole, these statutes are as good as we can do. 
The disappointment expressed in academic and popular literature about 
these statutes is typically that too few states have them, that some exonerees in 
states with statutes are denied compensation, and that, for some, the award 
takes too long to receive.  These are legitimate concerns, but the data also show 
that the vast majority of exonerees were convicted in states that today have a 
statute and that over 75% of applicants receive an award.  Instead, perhaps 
more telling is the finding that only about one-third of incarcerated exonerees 
were compensated, and they received, on average, less than $27,000 per year 
of incarceration.146  Those figures should be the source of greater dissatisfac-
tion with state wrongful compensation statutes.  They should also provide the 
basis for a belief that there is room to make considerable progress. 
C.  The Efficiency of State Compensation Statutes 
By efficiency, I do not mean the amount of time required between exon-
eration and compensation, although that would be an important measure of 
evaluation.  Instead, I refer to percentage of incarcerated exonerees who re-
ceived a state statutory award.  As noted, that figure is astonishingly low, only 
34.66%.  Two calculations form the basis of that finding – the percentage of 
incarcerated exonerees who seek compensation (state statutes generally require 
claimants to either file complaints in court or claims with a designated admin-
istrative entity to obtain compensation) and the percentage of filers who are 
denied compensation.147 
Why about 38% of exoneerees in states with statutes do not file likely 
depends on a number of factors, some of which are unique to the state in ques-
tion.  First, some states impose statutory barriers that preclude claims; removal 
of them may yield more awards.  Florida and Missouri, for example, have high 
non-filing rates.  Florida’s high non-filing percentage is likely due in large part 
to a unique statutory bar on compensation for persons who committed a felony 
prior their wrongful conviction.148  Missouri permits compensation only for 
those exonerated by DNA evidence.149  Maryland and Tennessee also have 
 
 145. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.  The number of DNA exonera-
tions, however, has generally leveled off.  Id.  State claims arising from DNA exoner-
ation are quite possibly the most likely claims granted because the showing of factual 
innocence is generally quite clear. 
 146. This figure is obtained by dividing the total cost by the years lost by exonerees 
convicted in states with statutes today. 
 147. For a brief discussion of the latter point, see supra note 128. 
 148. See supra note 8. 
 149. Of 37 Missouri exonerations, only 13 involved DNA and, of those, only 9 are 
on the Innocence Project’s list of DNA exonerees.  See INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/#missouri,exonerated-by-dna (last visited 
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high non-filing rates.  In those states, as in Maine, compensation is permitted 
only if the governor issues a pardon.150  Iowa, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Ohio, 
and, in certain cases, Virginia, preclude those who pled guilty from receiving 
compensation, even if that plea was coerced.151 
Second, at least some non-filing could be related to ungenerous statutes.  
Montana grants qualifying exonerees only tuition remission, and no Montana 
exoneree has sought it.152  Wisconsin awards a maximum of $25,000, regard-
less of the length of incarceration.153  Both have high non-filing rates.  In con-
trast, those states that have or had uncapped statutes (except Maryland), and 
thus relatively high awards (Connecticut, District of Columbia, New York, and 
West Virginia), have comparatively low non-filing rates.154 
Third, 22 states have adopted statutes since 1989.155  Half explicitly per-
mit those exonerated prior to the passage of the statute to file for compensation, 
but the statutes of the other half are silent on the point.  Of those, most appeared 
nevertheless to approve claims for persons exonerated before the adoption of 
the statute.  There were no retroactive claims filed in Minnesota and Utah.  That 
might explain some non-filing in those states.  But, non-filing by those exon-
erated prior to the adoption of a state statute may more realistically be ex-
plained for other reasons: they did not learn about these statutes, had passed 
away, were in prison for other crimes (which can be disqualifying), or simply 
chose not to pursue compensation.  As a result, it may not be surprising that 
states with quite recent and comparatively progressive statutes, like Colorado, 
Minnesota, and Washington, have high non-filing rates.  One would reasonably 
expect those to drop over time. 
Fourth, although this is not a state-specific issue, a significant number of 
non-filers spent relatively little time in prison.  The Registry calculates the 
number of years lost in incarceration by those exonerated in each state.156  The 
national average is 8.7 years, but of the 576 non-filers, 155 were incarcerated 
 
Apr. 26, 2017).  The other 4 are not because “post-conviction DNA evidence was not 
central to establishing innocence, and other non-DNA factors were essential to the ex-
oneration.”  COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 150. See supra note 8. 
 151. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 2017); see also Rhoades v. State, 880 
N.W.2d 431, 450 (Iowa 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(2) (West 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2) (West 
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10 (2017).  Of 8 non-filers in Iowa, 5 entered guilty 
pleas.  Four of 27 New Jersey exonerees pled guilty.  No exoneree from Oklahoma pled 
guilty.  COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 152. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (West 2017). 
 153. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2017). 
 154. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu (West 2017); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
423 (West 2017); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 2017); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-
2-13a (West 2017). 
 155. See Norris, supra note 99, at 298 fig.16.2 (tracing growth statutes from 1989 
to 2009). 
 156. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
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for less than 1 year.157  The majority, 81, were wrongly convicted in Texas for 
minor drug violations.  For this population, filing a claim may promise little 
benefit, particularly in relatively ungenerous states without attorneys’ fees pro-
visions and with a requirement to seek compensation judicially, rather than ad-
ministratively. 
While more research is required to isolate the causes of non-filing in other 
states lacking obviously plausible explanations, it is difficult to explain why 
the filing rate is quite high in other states.  Louisiana and Mississippi, for ex-
ample, have the two lowest non-filing rates.  Indeed, the procedures to obtain 
compensation in those states are not particularly user friendly; nor are they es-
pecially generous.  It is possible that the legal culture in certain states, sup-
ported by networks of criminal and civil attorneys experienced in wrongful 
conviction matters, and possibly aided by an active Innocence Project and ro-
bust media attention to wrongful convictions, can explain why the non-filing 
rate is lower in some states than others.  The fact remains, though, that fewer 
than 35% of exonerees in states with statutes obtain compensation.  In Part V, 
below, I offer several proposals that, if adopted, could increase that number. 
IV.  THE QUALITY OF STATE COMPENSATION RELIEF PROVISIONS 
An exploration of the number of claims filers and how many receive com-
pensation under state wrongful conviction compensation statutes says nothing 
about the quality of those statutes or whether they contain any of the four char-
acteristics that should be used to evaluate that quality: (1) financial adequacy, 
(2) non-monetary social and other services, (3) choice, and (4) opportunity for 
expedited resolution.  An examination of the approaches states have taken on 
these issues reveals that most fall far short of satisfying these features. 
A.  Financial Adequacy 
1.  What is Fair? 
Establishing an appropriate level of monetary compensation for the 
wrongly convicted is a profoundly difficult exercise.  One federal judge re-
sorted to a Broadway musical to pose the question: 
The Court is reminded of the well-known lyrics from Rent: 
Five hundred twenty-five thousand six hundred minutes 
How do you measure, measure a year? 
In daylights, in sunsets, in midnights, in cups of coffee 
 
 157. See id. 
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In inches, in miles, in laughter, in strife 
In five hundred twenty-five thousand six hundred minutes 
How do you measure a year in the life?158 
The exercise, however, is hardly unprecedented.  Congress, for example, re-
cently passed legislation authorizing $10,000 of compensation per day for the 
former Iranian hostages, and that metric had been established in the District of 
Columbia in hostage litigation under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.159 
In this context, judges and juries throughout the country have been re-
quired to assess appropriate monetary damages in wrongful conviction cases 
brought under federal civil rights theories and in states with uncapped statutory 
compensation provisions.  Recent jury verdicts in civil rights cases routinely 
approach or exceed $1 million per year of incarceration.160  Newton v. City of 
 
 158. Singletary v. District of Columbia, 876 F. Supp. 2d 106, 109 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(quoting JONATHAN LARSON, Seasons of Love, on RENT (Verve 1996)), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 766 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 159. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 
2242 (2015) (codified in scattered sections of 1 U.S.C.A., 2 U.S.C.A., 5 U.S.C.A., 7 
U.S.C.A., 10 U.S.C.A., 15 U.S.C.A., 16 U.S.C.A., 20 U.S.C.A., 21 U.S.C.A., 33 
U.S.C.A., 41 U.S.C.A., 42 U.S.C.A., 51 U.S.C.A.).  See generally Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (West 2017).  See, e.g., Moradi v. Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, 77 F. Supp. 3d 57, 69–70 (D.D.C. 2015) (using $10,000 per day of confine-
ment metric and citing prior cases using same metric). 
 160. The following is a fairly comprehensive listing of judgments issued after Jan-
uary 1, 2010, excluding those in the D.C. cases: Spencer v. Peters, 2017 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 8712, at *3–4 (9th Cir. May 18, 2017) (reinstating $9 million verdict for man 
incarcerated 19.6 years); Patrick v. City of Chicago, Civ. No. 14-cv-3658 (N.D. Ill.); 
Jason Meisner, Jury Awards $13.4 Million to Man Wrongly Imprisoned for Decades 
for Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 12, 2017, 8:02 PM) (jury award of $13,390,000 for 18.8 
years of wrongful incarceration; $712,000 per year); Fields v. City of Chicago, No. 10 
C 1168, 2012 WL 6705419 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 2012); Jason Meisner & Elyssa Cherney, 
Jury Awards $22 Million in Damages to Wrongly Convicted Ex-El Rukn, CHI. TRIB. 
(Dec. 15, 2016, 8:27 PM) ($22 million for 18 years of incarceration); Dean v. Cty. of 
Gage, 807 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Gage Cty. v. Dean, 136 S. 
Ct. 2490 (2016); Chris Dunker, Taxpayers, Not Insurance, to Pay for Gage County 
Mistake, LINCOLN J. STAR (July 6, 2016), http://journalstar.com/news/local/taxpayers-
not-insurance-to-pay-for-gage-county-mistake/article_bcd4bfd1-245b-5cb9-a946-
02a547a4c91a.html (total award of $28.1 million to 6 people, ranging from $350,000 
to $456,000 per year); Peacock v. City of Rochester, No. 6:13-cv-6046-MAT, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103544, at *9–13 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016) (awarding $5 million for 
a man unjustly incarcerated for rape for 5 years, 9 months, and 21 days, plus $750,000 
in post-release damages and lost wages); Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, Civ. No. 07-
08150 (S.D.N.Y.); Albert Samaha, Jury Awards Upstate Man $41 Million for 16-Year 
Wrongful Imprisonment, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 24, 2014, 11:48 AM),  http://www.vil-
lagevoice.com/2014/10/24/jury-awards-upstate-man-41-million-for-16-year-wrong-
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New York161 offers an interesting recent example.  In 1985, Alan Newton was 
convicted of 2 rapes and sentenced to 2 consecutive terms of imprisonment; he 
served 10 years for the first and 12 years for the second rape.162  After New 
York passed legislation entitling defendants to request DNA samples after con-
viction, Newton filed such a request for the second rape, but the rape kit asso-
ciated with it could not be found.163  Many years later, it was located, and the 
forensic testing exonerated Newton for the second crime.164  He filed and won 
a federal civil rights claim based on the city’s failure to timely locate the rape 
kit.165 
With respect to damages, Newton testified that he had not suffered phys-
ical injuries while incarcerated, that he sought no psychological treatment for 
depression after release, and that the 12 years of wrongful incarceration were 
 
ful-imprisonment/ (2015 verdict of $40 million for 16.5 years of wrongful incarcera-
tion, plus $1.65 million lost wages, or approximately $2.4 million per year); Restivo v. 
Nassau Cty., No. 06-CV-6720(JS)(SIL), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160336, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2015) (2014 verdict of $36 million to 2 plaintiffs who each spent 
18 years wrongly imprisoned, or $1 million per year); Ayers v. City of Cleveland, No. 
1:12-CV-00753, 2014 WL 2042254, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2014) ($13.2 million jury 
verdict for 12 years’ wrongful imprisonment), aff’d, 773 F.3d 161 (6th Cir. 2014); 
Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming § 1983 jury 
verdict of $25 million for 16 years of wrongful incarceration, or $1.5 million per year); 
Spadaro v. City of Miramar, No. 11-61607-CIV, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135646, at *6 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2013), aff’d, 591 Fed. App’x 906 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding $7 
million verdict for man incarcerated over 25 years); Slevin v. Bd. of Comm’rs for Cty. 
of Doña Ana, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274–78 (D.N.M. 2012) (holding $15.5 million 
compensatory damages verdict for 22 months in wrongful solitary confinement – 
$500,000 per month of confinement plus $1 million per year since release – was not 
excessive given evidence at trial); Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F. Supp. 2d 405, 426–27 
(D. Mass. 2011) (denying remittitur for $14 million jury award for 14 years of wrongful 
imprisonment), vacated on other grounds, 707 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2013); White v. 
McKinley, 605 F.3d 525, 539 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming § 1983 jury verdict of $14 
million compensatory damages for 5.5 years’ wrongful incarceration, or $2.5 million 
per year); Newton v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 140, 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2015) (rein-
stating 2010 jury verdict of $18 million for 12 years’ wrongful incarceration, about $1.5 
million per year), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 795 (2016), remittitur granted, 171 F. Supp. 
3d 156, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (remitted to $1 million per year).  Of the pre-2010 cases, 
perhaps the most influential has been Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 103–07 
(1st Cir. 2009), which affirmed as not excessive a $96 million wrongful conviction 
judicial verdict split among 4 plaintiffs – based on $1 million per year baseline.  See 
also Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 243–44 (D. Mass. 2007) (underly-
ing district court opinion setting damage amount, discussing wrongful conviction 
awards). 
 161. Newton, 171 F. Supp. 3d 156. 
 162. Id. at 160–61. 
 163. See id. at 160. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. at 161. 
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similar to those of the first 10 in which he was properly incarcerated.166  He did 
not seek economic damages.167  The jury, not told of this lawful conviction, 
awarded him $18 million, or $1.5 million per year of wrongful imprison-
ment.168  Ultimately, the city filed a motion for remittitur and was required to 
show that the verdict was “so high as to shock the judicial conscience and con-
stitute a denial of justice.”169 
That standard required comparing the outcome with other wrongful con-
viction cases.170  To do that, the court held that it would not consider settle-
ments because they “implicate compromise.”171  After discussing the remain-
ing competing cases cited by both parties, the court granted the remittitur.172  
The court’s rationale turned on distinguishing cases, in New York and else-
where, cited by Newton that awarded more than $1 million per year of incar-
ceration.173  Those cases involved the wrongful incarceration of youths, situa-
tions in which the incarceration was solely for crimes not committed, cases in 
which the plaintiff was physically abused, plaintiffs with ongoing mental 
health problems, and instances where post-release damages may have affected 
the jury’s valuation of harm.174  The key point here is not that the court granted 
the motion, but that the court’s “survey of other similar cases provide[d] further 
indication that an award of one million dollars per year of incarceration consti-
tutes the upper boundary for a reasonable award under the circumstances pre-
sented by this case.”175  Put differently, $1 million per year of incarceration is 
now the reasonable top “going rate,” subject to enhancement in particular cir-
cumstances.176 
 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. at 161 n.11. 
 168. See id. at 162. 
 169. Id. at 165 (quoting Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 165 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 170. As a result of a prior appeal and other delays, the city’s motion was actually 
filed over 5 years prior to the court’s ruling on the motion, but the court held that it 
could consider post-briefing cases in deciding the motion.  See id. at 172. 
 171. Id. at 172 n.98 (quoting Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 104 (1st Cir. 
2009)). 
 172. See id. at 177. 
 173. See id. at 172–77. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. at 174. 
 176. The court compared the Newton verdict with the $25 million verdict awarded 
to Jeffrey Deskovic, who was wrongly incarcerated for seventeen years for a rape-mur-
der, distinguishing it on the ground that Deskovic was very young (convicted at age 
16), as well as both the “level of governmental misconduct involved, and media atten-
tion it received.”  See id. at 175 n.118.  Factors relevant to the calculus are the nature 
of the crime for which the individual was unjustly convicted (sex offenses being the 
most stigmatizing and likely to result in prison violence), Peacock v. City of Rochester, 
No. 6:13-cv-6046, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103544, at *6–7 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016); 
Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *10–
11 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015), and whether the individual had previous experience 
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The substantially lower Odom and Tribble judgments, issued by two dif-
ferent D.C. Superior Court judges sitting without juries, offer additional insight 
into the valuation decision-making process.  Neither judge explained how or 
why he arrived at the particular $1000 per day or $400,000 per year metric 
applied in Odom and Tribble, respectively.  Neither compared the facts of these 
cases to others.  Their lengthy and detailed findings were, however, issued 
months after trial and reflect the time, thought, and care they brought to per-
form their “solemn charge.”177 
Most important, both were guided by the D.C. City Council’s intent to 
fully compensate the unjustly incarcerated.  Their findings of fact make two 
things very clear: (1) assessment is highly individualized, and (2) assessment 
involves consideration of a wide range of damages and harms experienced in 
prison and afterwards.  The findings in these cases view the loss of freedom 
not merely one-dimensionally in terms of years, but in a specific context that 
accounts for separation from family, friends, and children and the loss of per-
sonal promise.  The judges found relevant the brutality, desperation, condi-
tions, and fear inherent in prison life, the psychological impact of wrongful 
imprisonment, and the specific medical consequences of incarceration, as each 
was particularly experienced by the plaintiff.178  Put differently, the judges in 
Odom and Tribble did not decide upon a universally appropriate value of a day 
or year lost.  They instead assigned a value based for the actual harms, pain, 
and suffering experienced by the plaintiffs. 
2.  What Actually Happens 
All but 5 state compensation statutes, however, take an entirely different 
approach.  They either prescribe an unalterable daily or annual amount or im-
pose modest compensation caps, or do both.  I place these statutes in 3 basic 
categories.179  Category 1 statutes prescribe a daily or annual amount of com-
pensation during incarceration without an overall compensation cap.180  Cate-
 
in the criminal justice system, including prior incarcerations.  See Peacock, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10354, at *6. 
 177. Odom, 2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *54. 
 178. See id. at *54–56; see also Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-
003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *58–62 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016). 
 179. Montana is excluded because it offers only tuition benefits and no financial 
compensation.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (West 2017). 
 180. Missouri ($50 per day of incarceration = $18,250 per year), MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 650.058.1 (West 2017); Virginia (90% of per capita state income = $46,922.40 per 
year), VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11 (West 2017); Michigan ($50,000 per year of in-
carceration), MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1755(2)(a) (West 2017); Washington 
($50,000 per year; $100,000 per year if sentenced to death),WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
4.100.060(5)(a) (West 2017); New Jersey (two times prior income or $50,000 per year, 
whichever is higher), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5 (West 2017); California ($140 per day 
of incarceration = $51,110 per year), CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2017); Ohio 
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gory 2 statutes prescribe a daily or annual amount of compensation during in-
carceration with an overall compensation cap.181  Category 3 statutes impose a 
general overall cap on damages.182 
States with prescribed daily or annual non-economic damage amounts 
(Categories 1 and 2) depersonalize the compensation question by presuming 
that all wrongly incarcerated persons suffer equally.  For these states, all that 
matters is the number of years of incarceration.  Individual facts and circum-
stances are irrelevant, and the narratives of exonerees in these states go un-
heard.  State statutes with both prescribed awards and caps additionally penal-
ize those incarcerated the longest.  Those incarcerated for lengthy terms are 
effectively given no compensation for the later years of prison, reducing their 
average annual awards.183 
States with overall caps (Category 3) are similarly unfair to those incar-
cerated the longest.  To the extent that the state awards at or near the cap, the 
rate of annual compensation for those incarcerated for very lengthy periods 
 
($52,625.18 per year and lost wages, inflation adjusted), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2743.49 (West 2017); Colorado ($70,000 per year of incarceration; $120,000 per year 
if sentenced to death), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103 (West 2017); Texas 
($80,000 per year of incarceration), TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052 
(West 2017).  Vermont and Connecticut prescribe ranges: $30-60,000 per year and lost 
wages, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574 (West 2017), and $71,346-$142,692 per year, 
which is between one and two times Connecticut’s gross household income, CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu (West 2017). 
 181. Wisconsin ($5000 per year with $25,000 total cap), WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 
(West 2017); Utah ($42,180 (the Utah nonagricultrual annual wage) per year; 15-year 
cap), UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (West 2017); Mississippi ($50,000 per year; 
$500,000 cap), MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7 (West 2017); North Carolina ($50,000 per 
year; $750,000 cap), N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84 (West 2017); Florida ($50,000 
per year; $2 million overall cap), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.06 (West 2017).  Iowa varies 
slightly with a prescribed award of $50 per day and a cap of $25,000 per year in lost 
wages.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 2017).  Louisiana prescribes $25,000 per 
year capped at $250,000, plus up to $80,000 for loss of life opportunities.  LA. STAT. 
ANN. §15:572.8 (West 2017). 
 182. New Hampshire (cap of $20,000), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2017); 
Illinois (0-5 years of incarceration cap is $94,600; 5-14 years = $188,423; 14+ years = 
$ 230,732) (inflation adjusted 2016 figures), 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (West 
2017); Oklahoma (cap of $175,000), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154 (West 2017); 
Maine (cap of $300,000), ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 8242 (2017); Massachusetts (cap of 
$500,000, including services and tuition), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5 (West 
2017); Nebraska (cap of $500,000), NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4604 (West 2017); 
Tennessee (cap of $1,000,000), TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108 (West 2017). 
 183. For example, Mississippi, which awards $50,000 per year and imposes a 
$500,000 cap, effectively stops compensation at the end of 10 years.  MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 11-44-7.  Of 16 Mississippi exonerees, 9 were incarcerated for 10 years or longer.  
COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.  North Carolina awards $50,000 per year 
of incarceration, capped at $750,000.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84.  Of the 58 in-
carcerated exonerees in North Carolina, 20 served more than 15 years.  COMPLETE 
NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
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may be less than those incarcerated for less time.184  Illinois, with the third-
highest number of exonerees on the Registry, which oddly provides capped 
amounts for 0-5 years, 5-14 years, and over 14 years of incarceration, offers an 
excellent example.185  One 2010 exoneree received $85,350 for a 1.2-year 
wrongful incarceration, which exceeds $70,000 per year.186  Another man ex-
onerated the same year after 23.1 years of wrongful imprisonment was awarded 
$199,500, or just over $8600 per year.  Both received the maximum amount 
permitted for their durations of imprisonment.187  States with compensation 
caps produce unjustifiable inequalities among exonerees within the state. 
3.  Promising Alternatives? 
Only 3 states – Alabama, Connecticut, and Hawaii – provide for a specific 
damage floor and afford claimants an opportunity to seek additional monetary 
compensation based on particular individual circumstances.188  In theory, these 
states would allow the claimant to demonstrate that particular harms they ex-
perienced justify an enhanced compensatory award.  This would allow for an 
element of individualized decisionmaking similar to that offered in the Sep-
tember 11th Victim Compensation Fund, described below.  So far, however, 
they are not promising. 
Hawaii’s statute, which imposes a floor of $50,000 per year and an en-
hancement cap of $100,000, was enacted in 2016 and remains untested.189  
There have been, moreover, only three exonerations in Hawaii since 1989.190  
Connecticut, which permits an award between one and two times the state me-
dian household income, allows the Claims Commissioner to award an addi-
tional 25% based on statutory factors.191  That statute, amended in 2016 as de-
scribed, retreats from Connecticut’s previous uncapped provision and is also 
untested. 
Alabama’s statute merits closer attention because of its longer history and 
the greater number of exonerees in the state.  It sets a $50,000-per-year-of-
 
 184. In Massachusetts, the overall cap is $500,000, including the value of services 
and the tuition discount.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5.  The average wrongful 
incarceration in Massachusetts is 10.9 years.  See COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra 
note 107.  That caps the annual recovery for an average exoneree at less than $50,000 
per year.  Twenty-two of 48 incarcerated exonerees in Massachusetts served more than 
10 years.  Id. 
 185. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8. 
 186. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 187. Id. 
 188. In Hawaii, the claimant may seek additional compensation in “extraordinary 
circumstances.”  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661B-3(c)(3) (West 2017).  See ALA. CODE 
§ 29-2-159 (2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu (West 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 661B-3(c)(3). 
 189. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661B-3(c)(3). 
 190. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 191. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu. 
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imprisonment floor and an uncapped potential enhancement.192  However, my 
review of each claim filed under Alabama’s statute193 reveals that in only one 
case was a claimant awarded more than the presumptive amount, and the in-
crease was for litigation costs, not extraordinary non-economic damages.  At 
the same time, it does not appear that the claimants in the other cases had ever 
actually requested an evidentiary hearing to support a petition for an enhanced 
award. 
While it is premature to evaluate Connecticut and Hawaii, it is uncertain 
whether the adoption in other states of Alabama’s intriguing floor-plus-un-
capped-enhancement approach will work in practice.  Perhaps a concern in Al-
abama is the potential delay in compensation inherent in proceeding before the 
Committee and, if it grants supplemental compensation, waiting for state leg-
islative review.  That cumbersome procedure would provide a disincentive to 
seeking enhanced compensation.  Much better would be a process in which the 
base compensation amount is paid pending Committee and legislative review 
of a request for additional compensation. 
Just four states (Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and West Virginia) and 
the District of Columbia194 permit the exonerated claimant to seek full, tort-
based compensatory relief.  The results are widely variant and summarized in 
Table 1.  In Maryland, for example,195 the Board of Public Works makes com-
pensation awards, and state law requires claimants to have been pardoned by 
the governor.  Only 3 of 23 incarcerated Maryland exonerees on the Registry 
have been awarded compensation; the present value of those awards is $91 or 
$92 per day, less than one-tenth of that awarded by judges in the neighboring 
District of Columbia.196  As Table 1 shows, awards in the remaining uncapped 
states are considerably higher, but none except Minnesota offer reentry support 
and services. 
 
 192. ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-159(a)–(b). 
 193. Alabama has created a 9-person Committee on Compensation for Wrongful 
Incarceration, which consists primarily of high-ranking members of the state legislature 
or their designees. Id. §§ 29-2-151, 152.  A claimant asserting eligibility for compen-
sation submits an application to the state’s Division of Risk Management.  Id. § 29-2-
158(a).  If the Division finds the claimant eligible, the Committee has 90 days to certify 
an award.  Id. § 29-2-158(b).  The presumptive amount is $50,000 per year of incarcer-
ation.  Id. § 29-2-159(a).  However, a claimant may request additional compensation.  
Id. § 29-2-159(b).  If so, the Committee will convene a hearing and invite the attorney 
general and appropriate district attorney to attend and refute the claimant’s evidence.  
Id. § 29-2-159(c).  If the committee makes a presumptive or supplemental award, it 
does so in the form of a recommended bill presented to the state legislature.  Id. 
 194. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-423 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. 
§ 10-501 (West 2017); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 2017); W. Vᴀ. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-2-13a (West 2017). 
 195. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501.  Information from the Mary-
land Board of Public Works is on file with the author. 
 196. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
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Minnesota’s statute, enacted in 2014, deserves close attention because it 
adopts an innovative approach that rebalances state exposure and fair compen-
sation by capping certain forms of damages but not others.  Claims are decided 
by a 3-person compensation panel appointed by the Chief Justice of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court.197  The panel is required to consider the following ele-
ments of damages: (1) economic damages, including attorneys’ fees, lost 
wages, and costs of criminal defense; (2) reimbursement for medical and dental 
expenses already incurred and future unpaid expenses causally related to the 
wrongful imprisonment; (3) non-economic damages; (4) tuition benefits; (5) 
reimbursement for paid or unpaid child support payments; and (6) reimburse-
ment for paid or unpaid reintegrative expenses.198  Elements 2 and 3 are un-
capped, while elements 1 and 4 through 6 are capped at $100,000 per year of 
incarceration.199  The statute sets a floor: $50,000 per year of incarceration and 
$25,000 for each year on supervised release or as a registered predatory of-
fender.200  The Minnesota statute requires the legislature to approve awards 
made by the compensation panel.201 
So far, the results in Minnesota are encouraging.  A legislative subcom-
mittee has approved awards to 3 exonerated Minnesota men who were wrong-
fully imprisoned for 2, 3.1, and 5.5 years.202  They sought and are expected to 
receive a total of $1,787,000, or an average of nearly $170,000 per year.  How-
ever, Minnesota’s novel statute has not been replicated beyond that state, where 
only 11 people have been exonerated since 1989. 
4.  The Reality: Partial Compensation 
It is clear that all of the states with prescribed limits or overall caps com-
pensate far less than recent jury awards in civil rights cases or judgments in 
uncapped states.203  This is not an accident.  Many of the more recent state caps 
are keyed to the $50,000 per-year metric contained in the 2004 amendment to 
the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute.204  That $50,000 annual 
cap did not, however, reflect Congress’s judgment that such an amount fully 
compensates those wrongly convicted.  Indeed, the Senate report specifically 
noted that the $50,000 cap was less than initially proposed and less than many 
members wished.205  It was a compromise reflecting a realization that it did not 
 
 197. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.363 (West 2017). 
 198. Id. § 611.365, subdivs. 2(1)–(6). 
 199. Id. § 611.365, subdiv. 3. 
 200. Id. § 611.365, subdiv. 2. 
 201. Id. § 611.367. 
 202. Matt Sepic, Minn. Panel Approves Payment of $1.8M to Three Freed After 
Wrongful Convictions, MPR NEWS (Apr. 13, 2016), 
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/04/13/payments-to-wrongfully-convicted. 
 203. Newton v. City of New York, 171 F. Supp. 3d 156, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 204. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2012). 
 205. PATRICK LEAHY, THE INNOCENCE PROTECTION ACT OF 2002, S. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 107-
315, at 37 (2002). 
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represent full compensation for damages but instead was “the “very least that 
the Congress should do.”206 
Some states with caps similarly acknowledge that the limit does not re-
flect a legislative judgment that it is fully compensatory.  California, for exam-
ple, made this quite clear.  In its legislative findings, the California legislature 
expressed its intent to “remedy some of the harm caused to . . . factually inno-
cent people.”207  Moreover, in challenging as excessive an award of $1 million 
per year of unjust imprisonment in a Federal Tort Claims Act case,208 the 
United States pointed to § 2513 and state statutes with much smaller annual 
caps as evidence of more appropriate benchmarks for damages.  The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected that challenge and upheld the judg-
ment, holding that the state and federal caps “do not purport to measure the 
harm actually inflicted by wrongful incarceration; rather, each reflects a legis-
lative choice to limit the sovereign’s liability.”209  These caps are simply a par-
tial waiver of sovereign immunity.210 
It is plain, then, that the vast majority of state statutes are not fully com-
pensatory and are not intended to be.  By pegging compensation at a particular 
rate, multiplied by years of incarceration, or by imposing very low caps, they 
have no place for the careful and detailed individualized inquiries made in 
Odom and Tribble.  It is not simply that these statutes are insufficiently com-
pensatory; most have no mechanism to account for the particular damages and 
harms experienced by individual exonerees. 
Moreover, those state statutes that center on per-day and per-year incar-
ceration metrics are temporally limited.  On the front end, only 4 states permit 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. 2009 Cal. Stat. ch. 432, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 208. Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 209. Id. at 105. 
 210. In Singletary v. District of Columbia, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 suit against 
the District of Columbia, claiming that the D.C. Parole Board violated his right to due 
process when, without evidentiary support, it revoked his parole, resulting in Mr. Sin-
gletary’s incarceration for an additional ten years.  876 F. Supp. 2d 106, 107 (D.D.C. 
2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 766 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1565 (2015).  The jury awarded him $2.3 million, and the District of 
Columbia argued that the verdict was excessive, pointing to 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e), argu-
ing, in effect, that $50,000 per year is adequate and anything more is excessive.  Id. at 
108–10.  The court pointed out the false comparison: 
 
But what the legislature has determined that the government would be willing 
to pay to resolve a wrongful incarceration claim does not impose any sort of 
ceiling on what a jury can fairly decide.  Here, the jury – which heard all the 
evidence in the case and assessed the credibility of the witnesses, including the 
plaintiff – determined that an amount of money greater than what was contem-
plated in that statute was necessary to compensate plaintiff for the particular 
harm he experienced. 
 
Id. at 110. 
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compensation for pre-trial incarceration.211  On the back end, only 4 states ex-
plicitly recognize that the harms suffered by exonerees do not end on the day 
of release.212  The statutes in those states authorize compensation for post-re-
lease time spent on parole, probation, or a sex offender list.213  No capped state 
statute provides for post-parole or post-probation damages or for post-release 
damages experienced by those never placed on parole, placed on probation, or 
required to register as a sex offender. 
In addition, most state statutes overlook the significant economic costs 
associated with wrongful conviction.  The most significant of these is lost 
wages.  Only Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio, and Vermont have explicit 
lost wage provisions.214  New Jersey keys its cap to twice the annual lost wages 
or $50,000 per year, whichever is higher.215  Only 4 states contemplate the 
award of unpaid child support accrued during the wrongful incarceration.216  
Six states permit the reimbursement of court costs, penalties, fees, expenses, or 
attorneys’ fees arising from the underlying criminal case and/or post-convic-
tion litigation.217 
Yet, there are signs of progress.  The relatively new statutes in states like 
Washington, Colorado, Texas, and Minnesota, while adopting aspects of pre-
scribed awards and caps keyed to incarceration time, break free of the tradi-
tional mold that adheres only to those metrics.  These statutes reflect a more 
thoughtful approach to compensation, which more comprehensively accounts 
 
 211. ALA. CODE § 29-2-156(2) (2017) (pre-trial detainees on state felony charges 
for at least 2 years are eligible); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 611B-3(a)(3) (West 2017) 
(permits compensation for pre-trial detention in cases of conviction); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 148-84(a) (West 2017) (compensation includes time spent awaiting trial); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(5)(a) (West 2017) (compensation includes time 
waiting for trial if convicted).  These cases explicitly provide for compensation for pre-
trial detention under certain circumstances.  Cf. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(2)(a) 
(West 2017) (no compensation for pre-indictment detention). 
 212. Colorado, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington. 
 213. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(3)(a)(II) (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 590.11 (West 2017); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(b) (West 2017); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(5)(a).  No state statute explicitly provides for post-
parole or post-probation damages. 
 214. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(a)(2) (West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
663A.1(6)(c) (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.11 subdiv. 2(1); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2)(c) (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(b)(1) (West 
2017). 
 215. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(b) (West 2017). 
 216. Only Colorado, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington do so at present.  COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(2)(e)(II); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.11; TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(a)(2); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(5)(c). 
 217. Only Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Ohio, Vermont, and Washington generally do 
so.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-65-103(2)(e)(iv), (v); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
961.06(1)(c), (d) (West 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.6(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 5574(b)(1).  Nebraska will extinguish liens imposed to recover costs of state-provided 
criminal defense.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4605 (West 2017). 
39
Gutman: An Empirical Reexamination
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
408 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
for the duration of damages and the types of economic harms that the wrong-
fully exonerated have experienced.  As will be discussed in Part V, aspects of 
these statutes serve as useful models for a reconceived approach to the com-
pensation of the wrongfully convicted. 
B.  The Needs of the Exonerated 
There can be no doubt that many of the exonerated have significant health 
care, social service, job training and employment, and other needs.218  But, 
there is no reason to think that those needs are the same or equally pressing for 
all.  While many, like our client Donald Gates, were exonerated while in prison 
and thus released, many others, like our remaining clients, were exonerated 
post-release.  This is not to say that they had no need for services, but rather, 
that their needs for certain services were less pressing than those who, often 
without significant warning, suddenly find themselves released after a lengthy 
incarceration. 
A fair number of states219 recognize the social service needs of the exon-
erated and thus offer elements of this form of restorative justice in their stat-
utes,220 although few offer a comprehensive set of them.  Several states, with 
some limitations, offer the following services: (1) educational benefits, such as 
 
 218. See generally INNOCENCE PROJECT, Making Up for Lost Time, supra note 13; 
Robert J. Norris, Assessing Compensation Statutes for the Wrongly Convicted, 23 
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 352, 355–57 (2012).  See also Armbrust, supra note 11, at 170–
82 (advocating for “holistic” state compensation statutes that provide services and med-
ical insurance in addition to money); Jennifer L. Chunias & Yael Aufgang, Beyond 
Monetary Compensation: The Need for Comprehensive Services for the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105 (2008) (same).  Relying on psychological 
literature, Chinn and Ratliff detail the profound trauma experienced following release 
of those wrongfully convicted and argue that the exonerated should be offered transi-
tional services.  Chinn & Ratliff, supra note 55, at 415–18, 422–39, 442–43. 
 219. Of the 33 states (including the District of Columbia), with compensation stat-
utes, 15 offer no services at all (Alabama, California, District of Columbia, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Okla-
homa, Utah, and West Virginia).  The Nebraska statute oddly provides that it does not 
preclude the provision of services but does not require them.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
29-4606.  Costs of such services are deducted from the award.  Id. 
 220. For a discussion of restorative justice in this context, see Cathleen Burnett, 
Restorative Justice and Wrongful Capital Convictions: A Simple Proposal, 21 J. 
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 272, 280–86 (2005). 
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/7
2017] STATE COMPENSATION FOR THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 409 
free or reduced cost tuition at state public educational institutions;221 (2) em-
ployment training;222 (3) job search and placement;223 (4) medical and coun-
seling services;224 and (5) reentry or reintegration services.225  Whether they 
are actually sought and provided is much more difficult to determine. 
Here again, Minnesota’s statute is particularly thoughtful and comprehen-
sive.  It requires the panel awarding compensation to consider: (1) reimburse-
ment of medical and dental expenses and future unpaid expenses expected to 
be incurred as a result of the wrongful imprisonment; (2) reimbursement for 
tuition and fees for educational programs or employment skills and develop-
ment training and future costs for education and training, up to the cost of a 4-
year public university; and (3) paid or unpaid reintegrative expenses “for im-
mediate services secured by the claimant upon exoneration and release, includ-
ing housing, transportation and subsistence, reintegrative services, and medical 
and dental health care costs.”226 
The Texas statute is also comparatively progressive and, as shown below, 
can serve as a model for reform.  It requires that the same programs available 
for parolees be available to the wrongfully convicted.227  It also requires the 
development of a comprehensive plan to ensure the “successful reentry and 
 
 221. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(2)(e)(II) (Colorado awards tuition waiv-
ers at state colleges for the exonerated person and for his or her children conceived or 
adopted prior to incarceration if the claimant was unjustly incarcerated for more than 3 
years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(2)(c) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
961.06(1)(b); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2)(c)(i) (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 258D, § 5(A) (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.362, subdiv. 2(4); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84(c)(2) (West 
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(C) (West 2017) ($10,000 community college ca-
reer or technical training reimbursement). 
 222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(e); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84(c)(1). 
 223. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1015/2 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
15:572.8(H)(2)(a) (job skills training for 3 years); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84(c)(1) 
(for at least 1 year). 
 224. LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(2)(b) (for 6 years); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. 
& PROC. § 10-501(a)(1) (West 2017) (Board of Public Works may “grant a reasonable 
amount for any financial or other appropriate counseling”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
258D, § 5(A); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365, subdivs. 2(2), (6) (West 2017) (allows for 
reimbursement for medical and reintegrative services); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 
5574(b)(2) (West 2017) (up to 10 years of health coverage equivalent to Medicaid). 
 225. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(e); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1710/125 
(reentry services limited to assistance in obtaining mental health services); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 611.365, subdiv. 2(6); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(b) (West 2017) (claimant 
may be awarded other non-monetary relief, including vocational training, tuition assis-
tance, counseling, housing assistance, and health insurance coverage); TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 501.101(b) (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574(b)(3); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.100.060(10) (West 2017) (claimant may seek referral to reentry 
services; statute silent on who pays for services). 
 226. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365, subdiv. 2(6). 
 227. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.101(b). 
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reintegration” of wrongfully imprisoned persons.228  That plan must include 
life skills, job, and vocational training for as long as they are needed, assistance 
in identifying needed documents, and financial assistance of up to $10,000 for 
living expenses following the release from prison.229 
These statutes reflect efforts to proactively identify and provide the assis-
tance particular exonerees specifically require.  They view the exonerated as 
individuals with unique and personal needs that government programs can ad-
dress, rather than as a depersonalized multiplication problem.  The inclusion of 
social services and other reentry support in new state compensation statutes is 
the most significant improvement in these statutes over the last decade. 
C.  Expedited Consideration and Choice 
The process that results in a state compensation award involves two steps: 
(1) the post-conviction process aimed at obtaining a vacatur of the conviction, 
dismissal of the indictment, and/or a certificate of actual innocence and (2) a 
compensatory process in which a civil remedy is sought.  Outside the scope of 
this Article is the length of post-conviction relief procedures.230  Compensatory 
delay can be devastating, particularly for those freed from prison with nothing 
following post-conviction relief.231 
The first potential cause of compensatory delay is essentially factual and 
raises the question of whether the findings and conclusions made during the 
post-conviction proceedings are given preclusive effect in the civil claim for 
compensation.  Our D.C. cases, for instance, involved unique questions about 
the preclusive effect of facts recited in the certificates of innocence awarded at 
 
 228. Id. § 501.102(b). 
 229. Id. 
 230. A terrible practice, but one in which counsel in post-conviction relief proceed-
ings and compensation cases may face and manage jointly, are offers by the State to 
concede post-conviction relief in exchange for an agreement to waive rights to civil 
damages.  Josh Saul, The Fairbanks Four’s Brutal Fight for Freedom, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 
12, 2016, 5:39 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/01/22/alaska-fairbanks-four-
and-how-murder-convictions-end-414201.html.  Such was the case in for “Fairbanks 
Four” in Alaska whose convictions were reversed in exchange for a waiver.  Id. 
 231. See, e.g., Marie C. Baca, Wrongly Convicted Face Uphill Battle to Obtain 
Compensation, CAL. WATCH (Mar. 5, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/public-
safety/wrongly-convicted-face-uphill-battle-obtain-compensation-9014 (California 
process can take 2 years from filing to hearing); Glaun, supra note 122 (2 years is al-
lowed for discovery in compensation cases); Ziva Branstetter, Few Exonerees Receive 
Payment for Wrongful Convictions, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 23, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/newshomepage1/few-exonerees-receive-payment-for-
wrongful-convictions/article_0f8f4e61-ca52-57bf-a8c5-ad3014fe4003.html (last up-
dated Apr. 23, 2016) (describing Nebraska man’s 10-year effort to receive compensa-
tion). 
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the conclusion of post-conviction proceedings, during which federal prosecu-
tors represented the interests of the District of Columbia.232  The second often-
litigated issue concerns whether the exonerated claimant satisfies the statutory 
prerequisites of the state compensation statute.233  As shown in Table 1, this 
litigation or administrative adjudication is not uncommon – 109 claims by 
claimants on the Registry were denied, and an unknown number surmounted 
challenges to compensability.234  The third potential source of delay arises in 
the process by which the amount of compensation for qualified exonerees is 
set and ultimately awarded.235  Delay can follow when the statute fails to im-
pose deadlines for the administrative processing of the award,236 when the ad-
ministrative adjudication amounts to a recommendation to the state legislature 
 
 232. In the absence of statutory direction, this can involve some potentially tricky 
issues.  For instance, a county district attorney may agree that the former defendant is 
factually innocent, but a stipulated order to that effect may not be binding on the sepa-
rate governmental entity, the State, litigating the claim for compensation.  This may 
raise the questions whether the issue of factual innocence was “actually litigated” and 
whether the State is in privity with the county, such that the State is deemed to have 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.  See Tennison v. Cal. Victim Comp. 
& Gov’t Claims Bd., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 95–101 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing 
preclusion question prior to statutory amendment).  California, Illinois, and Ohio, for 
example, resolve that issue by deeming declarations or certificates of factual innocence 
binding on subsequent claims for damages.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.865 (West 2017); 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-702(j) (West 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2743.48(E)(1) (West 2017). 
 233. See supra note 128. 
 234. See infra Table 1. 
 235. The Minnesota statute offers a clear example of a bifurcated process.  MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 590.11 (West 2017), held unconstitutional on other grounds, Back v. 
State, 883 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).  In Minnesota, a claimant must first file 
an action in court for an order declaring him or her eligible for compensation, to which 
the prosecutor responds.  Id.  If granted, the claimant files a separate claim for compen-
sation with the state supreme court.  Id. § 611.362. 
 236. Twenty-five of the state statutes have no deadlines for the resolution of the 
claim for compensation and subsequent award, if granted.  Several contain tepid exhor-
tations that the matter be resolved as soon as practical.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-65-02(6) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(H)(1) (West 2017).  In 
New York, the matter must be given docket priority.  N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(2) 
(McKinney 2017).  Those with some specific deadlines generally do not impose time 
frames covering each step of the process.  In California, for example, the Victim Com-
pensation and Government Claims Board is required to calculate the amount of com-
pensation within 30 days of presentation, and the attorney general may respond within 
60 days to claims that were not based on a certificate of innocence or writ of habeas 
corpus.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 4902(a).  However, the following hearing is scheduled at 
the “earliest date convenient,” and no deadline is set for a decision or for legislative 
review of any recommended payments.  Id. § 4902(b).  See also Pishko, supra note 2 
(noting that the California Claims Board process “takes no less than [a] year, and often 
much more than that”). 
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to make a future payment,237 or when a civil lawsuit is required to obtain com-
pensation.238  It took Kirk Odom 3 years from the filing of his complaint to 
receive his compensation, and Santae Tribble waited even longer. 
Given the state interest in ensuring that an exonerated individual meets 
the requirements of the state compensation statute, devoting the time necessary 
to make that determination is inevitable, particularly in cases raising real ques-
tions of qualification.  The delay inherent in resolving questions of qualifica-
tion, real or imagined, however, gives the state bargaining leverage in cases 
that may be subject to settlement.  That leverage can be very effective with 
exonerees desperate for support. 
Some states address this issue by requiring the state, represented by the 
attorney general’s office or district attorney, to announce whether it will oppose 
the claim on qualification grounds by a certain date.239  Opposed claims are 
litigated judicially or administratively.  Unopposed claims move on to a deter-
mination of compensation.  Once that stage is reached, however, no state offers 
the exoneree the choice to either receive a set of services and prescribed mon-
etary award or to pursue litigation seeking more than that prescribed award. 
As described below, that election of remedies concept would give the 
qualifying exoneree a choice to trade compensation for speed.  They should be 
permitted to select a package of compensation and services to be provided 
quickly or proceed to litigate the compensation question.  For our clients, only 
the latter option was available.  But, as explored in the next section, the reme-
dial frameworks of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and 
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund offer design features that 
might fit in a more flexible state compensation scheme in a manner that can 
benefit both the states and exonerees.  
V.  ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS PROCESSING MODELS 
A.  The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 
 
A small percentage of individuals who are administered a vaccine expe-
rience an adverse reaction to it.  In the early 1980s, the number of lawsuits 
 
 237. ALA. CODE § 29-2-165(a) (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904; MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 611.368; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(A) (West 2017).  This problem has 
been particularly acute recently in Illinois.  See Lolly Bowean, Freed from Prison, but 
Waiting Compensation as State Budget Fight Drags On, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2015, 5:00 
PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-exonerated-payouts-held-met-
20151009-story.html. 
 238. A 2007 New York Times analysis of claims that individuals filed on the Inno-
cent Project’s listing of persons exonerated through DNA analysis found that over half 
of those awarded compensation received it 2 or more years after exoneration.  Janet 
Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After Exoneration, and Justice Is Slow 
to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), http://www.ny-
times.com/2007/11/25/us/25dna.html. 
 239. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §661B-2(b) (West 2017). 
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seeking compensation for such injuries grew, causing 2 of the 3 domestic vac-
cine manufacturers to exit the market.240  The supply of vaccines was threat-
ened, rates of vaccinations dropped, and compensation for injury was slow and 
difficult.241  Congress passed the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 
1986242 to replace the traditional tort system for this category of injury with the 
intent to resolve this serious dilemma. 
The Act created an adjudicatory process that largely preempted state tort 
suits against vaccine manufacturers and healthcare providers.243  Petitioners are 
required to file claims for damages in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.244  
They are not required to demonstrate fault but must show causation.  To facil-
itate the showing of causation in certain cases, a Vaccine Injury Table (“Ta-
ble”) was developed.245  If a listed side effect is experienced within the time 
periods following administration of particular vaccines set forth in the Table, 
causation is presumed; it then becomes incumbent on the government to rebut 
that presumption.246  A Special Master of the Court of Federal Claims decides 
the claim within 240 days of filing,247 subject to time-restricted review by the 
Court of Federal Claims.248 
The statute compensates the injured petitioner fully for causally related 
medical, social service, and other expenses, as well as lost wages.249  Injured 
petitioners who prove causation are also entitled to compensation for pain and 
suffering, but this category of damages is capped at $250,000.250  Damages are 
 
 240. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 227 (2011).  For a detailed descrip-
tion of the history leading to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, see Nora 
Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1655–58 (2015). 
 241. Wyeth, 562 U.S. at 227. 
 242. See Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34).  The National Vaccine Injury Compen-
sation Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.  Id. 
 243. Unless the petitioner seeks less than $1000, he or she may not sue a vaccine 
administrator or manufacturer without first proceeding in the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims.  42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (West 2017).  For a description of the history of 
the Act, and its provisions, see Engstrom, supra note 240; Peter H. Meyers, Fixing the 
Flaws in the Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 785, 
792–96 (2011). 
 244. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-11(a)(1). 
 245. Id. § 300aa-14(a); 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2017). 
 246. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-11(c)(1), 300aa-13(a)(1)(A).  The petitioner must prove 
causation through conventional means in cases not covered by the Table.  Meyers, su-
pra note 243, at 790–91, 798, 801.  The substantial majority of vaccine injury cases no 
longer involve use of the Table.  As a result, this litigation-shortening mechanism is 
now largely inoperative. 
 247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(ii). 
 248. Id. § 300aa-12(e)(2) (the court has 120 days from the date of filing of the re-
sponse brief to complete its review). 
 249. Id. §§ 300aa-15(a)(1), (3). 
 250. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(4). 
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also capped at $250,000 in cases of death.251  Attorneys’ fees are awarded in 
cases in which the petitioner prevails and in cases in which he or she does not, 
so long as the “petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable 
basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.”252  Attorneys’ fees are 
paid by the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund. 
The government or patient, rather than the vaccine manufacturer, pays an 
excise tax on each vaccine to fund the Trust Fund, from which money is drawn 
to pay damages, costs, and fees under the Act.253  The current excise tax is 75 
cents per vaccine recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention.254  To provide a sense of the scope of the program, from October 1, 
1988, to March 1, 2017, 17,935 claims for compensation have been filed, of 
which 5,269 were granted.255  Total outlays have been $3,619,323,678.256  Of 
this total, $3,363,282,409 went to petitioners, and the balance of $256,041,269 
was paid to attorneys.257 
Under the Act, if claimants are dissatisfied with the results of their peti-
tions before the Court of Federal Claims, they may elect to file a civil action 
within 90 days.258  The scope of permissible civil actions against manufacturers 
or health care providers is, however, quite narrow.259  The Act preempts certain 
claims against providers and manufacturers, including those for design de-
fect.260  Before the Bruesewitz decision in 2011, which further narrowed the 
scope of available remedies for petitioners who opt out, 99.8% of petitioners 
who received an award chose not to reject it in favor of a civil action.261 
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program has been subject to 
substantial criticism.262  Of greatest concern in this context is the failure of 
petitions to be decided within the 240-day deadline set in the Act.  In fact, fewer 
than 5% of claims are decided timely, with an average resolution length of 
more than 5 years.263  As time has passed, far fewer cases have been guided 
 
 251. Id. § 300aa-15(a)(2). 
 252. Id. § 300aa-15(e). 
 253. See id. § 300aa-15(i)(2); see also Meyers, supra note 243, at 793. 
 254. 26 U.S.C. § 4131(b)(1) (2012). 
 255. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADM’R, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM: MONTHLY STATISTICS REPORT 
5 (updated Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/data/vicpmonth-
lyreporttemplate3_1_17.pdf. 
 256. Id. at 8–9. 
 257. Id. 
 258. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-21(a). 
 259. Id. §§ 300aa-22(b), (c). 
 260. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011).  See also Engstrom, 
supra note 240, at 1664. 
 261. Engstrom, supra note 240, at 1664 n.186. 
 262. See generally id.; Meyers, supra note 243, at 792–809. 
 263. Engstrom, supra note 240, at 1685. 
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toward resolution by reference to the Table, requiring causation to be liti-
gated.264  In addition, part of that delay is attributable to complexities in as-
sessing damages, even though certain elements of damages are prescribed by 
statute.265  The hope that such damage determinations could be made more co-
operatively has collided with the default position in American litigation – ad-
versarialism.266 
B.  The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
After the September 11th terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Air Trans-
portation Safety and System Stabilization Act.267  That Act created the Sep-
tember 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which was intended to provide mon-
etary compensation to those physically injured in the attacks and to the families 
of those killed.268  Congress intended that potential claimants either elect to 
pursue no-fault compensation from the Fund, administered by a Special Mas-
ter,269 or to pursue litigation through an exclusive federal remedy created in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.270  The Special Mas-
ter was tasked with determining eligibility for compensation and the amount of 
compensation awarded to those found eligible.271  The statute authorized the 
Special Master to make individualized determinations of compensation, ac-
counting for economic and noneconomic harm and deducting collateral source 
 
 264. Meyers, supra note 243, at 799–805. 
 265. Engstrom, supra note 240, at 1691–92. 
 266. Id. at 1664 n.186. 
 267. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).  A key 
purpose of the Act was to ensure the continued operation of the airlines in light of 
concern that their insurance carriers might terminate coverage and insufficient funds 
would be available in the capital markets to fund a potentially enormous liability.  147 
CONG. REC. H5894–5902 (Sept. 21, 2001).  Compensation for any suit filed against an 
airline was capped at the amount of the airline’s insurance coverage.  § 408(a), 115 
Stat. at 240.  That limitation was later extended to other potential defendants in litiga-
tion, such as airline security, the owners of the World Trade Center, and airport owners 
and operators.  Aviation Transportation and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201, 
115 Stat. 646 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)). 
 268. § 403, 115 Stat. at 237–41. 
 269. Id. § 404.  Filing a claim with the Special Master effects a waiver of rights to 
pursue a judicial remedy.  Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).  The Attorney General selected Ken-
neth Feinberg to serve as the Special Master.  KENNETH R. FEINBERG, DEP’T OF JUST., 
FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM 
COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 6 (2004), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/175/2016/01/September-11-Victim-Compensation-Fund-Final-Report-
Volume-I-1.pdf. 
 270. § 408(b), 115 Stat. at 2401–41. 
 271. Id. § 405(b)(1). 
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payments.272  The Special Master had 120 days after a claim was filed to make 
such determinations, and those determinations were final.273 
The statute therefore required the Special Master to make case-by-case 
determinations based on traditional no-fault tort principles.  At the same time, 
pursuant to the statute’s directive that he also consider “the individual circum-
stances of the claimant,”274 the Special Master, Kenneth Feinberg, included in 
his consideration of individual circumstances “the financial needs or financial 
resources of the claimant or the victim’s dependents and beneficiaries.”275  
Nonetheless, Special Master Feinberg viewed his charge as not making 
“widely disparate” awards to claimants.276  And the statute required those dif-
ficult determinations, and the resulting payments, to be made very quickly, 
which dampened any inclination to make time consuming, highly individual-
ized determinations. 
For those killed in the attacks, Special Master Feinberg crafted “pre-
sumed” economic loss metrics for the calculation of lost future earnings in-
tended to be both generous and easy to administer.277  The presumed noneco-
nomic loss for those killed was set at a uniform $250,000, plus $100,000 for 
the spouse and each dependent.278  The claimant could, however, attempt to 
persuade the Special Master to depart from the presumed awards in cases of 
“extraordinary circumstance.”279 
With respect to economic loss in death cases, such extraordinary circum-
stances included an income exceeding the ninety-eighth percentile or a demon-
stration of greater-than-expected potential for job advancement.280  The regu-
lations also permitted the Fund to enhance awards when the victim or victim’s 
family “would suffer significant out-of-pocket expenses in order to maintain 
daily care and household services.”281  The Fund’s final report stated that over 
 
 272. Id. §§ 405(b)(1)(B), (b)(6).  The Act, then, contained provisions reflecting a 
collective needs-based model (fault and contributory fault were irrelevant, with set-offs 
for collateral sources) and a competing individual entitlements model (awarding com-
pensation for economic and subjective noneconomic losses).  Robert L. Rabin, Septem-
ber 11 Through the Prism of Victim Compensation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 464, 469–71 
(2006) (reviewing KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE 
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005)). 
 273. § 405(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 239. 
 274. Id. § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
 275. 28 C.F.R. § 104.41 (2017). 
 276. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 5. 
 277. Id. at 7–9, 30–31; see 28 C.F.R. § 104.43.  Additional economic losses in-
cluded medical expenses, loss of services, and burial costs.  Id.  Special Master Fein-
berg described the methodology in a statement.  DEP’T OF JUST., EXPLANATION OF 
PROCESS FOR COMPUTING PRESUMED ECONOMIC LOSS (2002), www.justice.gov/ar-
chive/victimcompensation/vc_matrices.pdf. 
 278. 28 C.F.R. § 104.44. 
 279. Id. § 104.33(e)(2). 
 280. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 37–38. 
 281. Id. at 38. 
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300 families demonstrated “extraordinary special needs, such as children suf-
fering from serious medical conditions or developmentally disabled family 
members who had depended on the victim’s assistance for daily care,”282 as 
well as the loss of unborn children. 
The presumed noneconomic loss award was also adjusted upward in ex-
traordinary cases.  Such cases included the loss of multiple family members in 
the attacks, the death of other close family members shortly before or after 
September 11, 2001, situations in which children lost both parents, circum-
stances in which an individual was severely injured and later died, cases of 
pregnant victims, and instances when surviving spouses of deceased victims 
miscarried due to trauma.283  Such increased awards were made in 75 cases.284 
With respect to those injured in the attacks, Special Master Feinberg de-
termined economic loss on a case-by-case basis, depending on the severity and 
permanency of the injury.285  Given the wide variations in physical injuries, 
Special Master Feinberg did not adopt a set non-economic injury award.  In-
stead, he used the $250,000 figure in death cases as a guide and adjusted it 
based on “the nature, severity and duration of the injury and the individual cir-
cumstances of the claimant.”286  In sum, one observer stated, “[T]he resultant 
mix of presumptive scheduling tempered by personal empathy and pecuniary 
adjustments at the margin was the touchstone to the success of the program.”287 
Special Master Feinberg created 2 claims processing tracks once it was 
determined that the written claim was substantially complete.  Under Track A, 
Fund evaluators issued decisions of eligibility and made a presumed eligibility 
award.288  The claimant then had a right to appeal that award at an in-person 
hearing, during which he or she could argue that “extraordinary circumstances” 
warranted an upward adjustment to the presumed award.289  Under Track B, a 
hearing before the Special Master or his designee was held after the claim was 
found substantially complete.290  The award determination (if any) was made 
 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 42–43. 
 284. Id. at 43. 
 285. 28 C.F.R. § 104.45 (2017). 
 286. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 43.  See 28 C.F.R. § 104.46.  The highest none-
conomic award in an injury case was $6 million.  FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 43.  
Four percent were greater than $250,000.  Id.  The Report identified those with cata-
strophic burns as those warranting high noneconomic compensation.  Id. 
 287. Rabin, supra note 272, at 478. 
 288. Id. at 477 n.59. 
 289. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 15.  See 28 C.F.R § 104.31(b)(2).  The “extraor-
dinary circumstances” standard for a departure from the presumed award is found at 28 
C.F.R. § 104.33(f)(2). 
 290. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 15. 
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thereafter without a right of appeal.291  In total, just over 3000 hearings were 
held regarding award amounts for injury and death cases combined.292 
Ninety-seven percent of eligible families of deceased and injured victims 
obtained compensation through the Fund.293  Ninety-five lawsuits were filed 
on behalf of 96 claimants in the Southern District of New York.294  Thirteen of 
the cases (principally against airline carriers) settled quickly.295  Subsequent 
delays and complications in discovery prompted Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, 
who oversaw the lawsuits, to assign a mediator to attempt to settle the remain-
ing cases.296  Ultimately, all settled.297 
Prior to the issuance of Judge Hellerstein’s Order and the Mediator’s Re-
port, Professor Gillian K. Hadfield conducted an empirical study in which she 
surveyed and interviewed claimants about their choice between seeking com-
pensation from the Fund or pursuing federal litigation.298  Professor Hadfield 
concluded that “the choice between accepting a payment from the Fund and 
going to court was not exclusively, or even primarily, framed as a financial 
calculation.”299  Although those who settled after pursuing litigation appeared 
 
 291. Id.  According to the Report, claimants for deceased persons split fairly evenly 
between choosing Track A or Track B.  Id. at 16.  Eighty-nine percent of injured claim-
ants chose Track A.  Id. 
 292. Id. at 18, 111.  To put that in context, 2968 claims were filed for deceased 
victims for which there were 2880 awards.  Id.  Nearly $6 billion, after offsets, were 
awarded.  Id. at 110.  The average award was $2,082,035.07.  Id.  Further, 4435 claims 
were filed for injured victims.  Id.  The Fund made 2680 awards, totaling just over $1 
billion.  Id.  The average award was $392,968.11.  Id. 
 293. Id. at 1. 
 294. In re September 11 Litigation, No. 21 MC 101, slip op. at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 
2009) (order accepting mediator’s report and providing that it be filed). 
 295. Id. at 5. 
 296. Id. at 6–8. 
 297. Id. at 8 (at the time the report was issued, 3 cases remained unsettled).  A 
number of cases settled after damages-only discovery and jury trials in a sample of 6 
cases.  Id. at 7–8.  See also Benjamin Weiser, Value of Suing over 9/11 Deaths Is Still 
Unsettled, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/nyre-
gion/13lawsuits.html?_r=0.  The last case settled in 2011.  Benjamin Weiser, Family 
and United Airlines Settle Last 9/11 Wrongful-Death Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/nyregion/last-911-wrongful-death-suit-is-
settled.html.  The mediator assigned by Judge Hellerstein reported that the total amount 
of settlements in the 93 cases was approximately $500 million, or roughly $5 million 
per case.  See In re September 11 Litigation, No. 21 MC 101, slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 3, 2009) (report of the mediator on the mediation and settlement efforts of the 
parties in the cases previously docketed under 21 MC 97).  That compares to an average 
award of just over $2 million in death cases made by the Fund.  FEINBERG, supra note 
269, at 1.  The Mediator’s Report, however, cautions that such a comparison may be 
misleading because some of the cases involved those with extremely high earnings or 
other extraordinary circumstances.  September 11 Litigation, slip op. at 13. 
 298. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice between Cash and the Courthouse: 
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008). 
 299. Id. at 647. 
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to have recovered more than the average Fund recipient, obtaining that higher 
amount was not, she concluded, an important reason for making that choice.300 
Professor Hadfield’s surveys and interviews revealed that a substantial 
number of respondents believed that parties other than the hijackers (such as 
airline security firms, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service) deserved a measure of blame for the resulting 
deaths and injuries.301  Ten of Professor Hadfield’s interviewees went the liti-
gation route, and, she found, none did so for financial reasons.302  Instead, they 
were motivated by a desire to punish, to achieve a public attribution of respon-
sibility, to learn about what happened, to prevent a recurrence, or to avoid being 
perceived as taking “hush money.”303  Some felt that litigation was part of re-
sponsible citizenship in which they acted “as an agent of the community to gain 
information about what happened, to hold people accountable, and to play a 
role in prompting responsive change.”304 
Professor Hadfield found that 57% of the claimants who sought compen-
sation through the Fund regarded that decision as “‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ 
hard.”305  Ten percent regretted their choice, and 25% were unsure about 
whether they were right in choosing the Fund.306  Of those who found the de-
cision difficult, non-monetary concerns substantially outweighed monetary 
considerations in their thinking.307  Of those who did not, non-monetary con-
siderations, such as financial pressure to obtain an award quickly and concerns 
about the emotional stress of litigation, significantly outweighed monetary fac-
tors.308  Some did not believe that litigation would achieve the non-monetary 
goals that litigants believed could be furthered.309 
C.  Transferrable Elements 
Although done in different ways and with varying degrees of success, the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and the September 11th Vic-
tim Compensation Fund both attempted to deal with the problem of compen-
sating substantial numbers of persons for tragic injury in ways that strongly 
steered claimants away from the traditional litigation model.  They attempted 
to tackle very different kinds of problems.  The September 11th Victim Com-
pensation Fund was occasioned by a single horrendous event that summoned a 
national will to compensate the victims of those attacks quickly, sensitively, 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 653–59. 
 302. Id. at 660–61. 
 303. Id. at 659–62. 
 304. Id. at 673. 
 305. Id. at 663. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 664–70. 
 309. Id. at 666.  In retrospect, that belief seems to have been borne out.  All but 3 
litigants settled without obtaining substantial discovery on liability.  Id. at 675. 
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and with meaningful, but not unbounded, generosity.  The National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program, in contrast, more closely resembles wrongful 
conviction compensation, in the sense that it deals with the resolution of ongo-
ing claims that will arise indefinitely. 
The question of qualification for compensation was, in the vast majority 
of cases, a non-issue in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund con-
text.  Use of the Vaccine Table was initially expected to make qualification 
straightforward in vaccine injury cases as well, but it has not turned out that 
way.  Qualification decisions in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program follow a far more adversarial process as the Table has applied to fewer 
and fewer cases.  This has created significant delay in the resolution of vaccine 
compensation qualification decisions. 
On the compensation side, both programs incorporated varying concepts 
of floors and caps, but they also created mechanisms for determining whether 
appropriate compensation should exceed the floors or fall below those caps.  
For the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, those mechanisms and 
hard deadlines promised claimants a more efficient and shorter claims resolu-
tion process, with the Special Master as the ultimate decider.  The Fund’s suc-
cess was largely attributable to the Special Master’s efforts to create a non-
adversarial process, administered by sensitive and empathetic staff, guided by 
a claimant-centered mission.  Compensation through the National Vaccine In-
jury Compensation Program, however, continues to be subject to the delay in-
herent in an adversarial process. 
This brief comparison highlights the age-old conflicts in any claims res-
olution process.  When qualification for compensation can be uncertain or de-
batable, individualized determinations are necessary.  Those determinations 
can follow from claimant-driven advocacy or an adversarial process.  The time 
required to make those decisions depends on the nature of that advocacy, the 
volume of the claims, the complexity of the decision, and the number of deci-
sion-makers available.  In the wrongful conviction compensation context, that 
decision-making process ranges from an administrative claims process, in 
which risk managers quickly decide written applications, to traditional adver-
sarial litigation that, on occasion, reaches state supreme courts. 
Uniform compensation may be efficiently and fairly determined when 
claimants suffer identical injuries.  However, when the compensatory determi-
nation may depend on individualized characteristics, a fact-finder informed 
through an advocacy process must determine what characteristics are relevant, 
whether they are present, and what weight they should be given; then, the fact-
finder must apply those determinations to the established compensatory metric.  
The result may be comparatively fairer outcomes for claimants but ones that 
may be obtained at some cost in time and money. 
For at least some exonerees in certain states, the statutory process for re-
ceiving compensation for wrongful conviction combines the worst aspects of 
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and the September 11th 
Victim Compensation Program.  For some listed on the Registry, the circum-
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stances of their exonerations nevertheless raise questions about their qualifica-
tions under state statutes.  Those qualification determinations are often adver-
sarial and delayed, particularly when the decision-maker is a busy judge rather 
than a specialized administrative decision-maker.  For those found qualified, 
the resulting compensation decisions are, in most states, non-individualized but 
nevertheless subject to delay.  And, they are often both comparatively and nor-
matively unjust due to prescribed awards and caps and the lack of an oppor-
tunity to seek exceptions for special individual circumstances.  The task next, 
then, is to draw upon the best features of these programs to craft a better com-
pensation system for exonerees that is also mindful of the concerns of the 
states. 
VI.  A PROPOSAL 
As explained, there are three pieces to this puzzle.  The first involves the 
often lengthy and complex post-conviction procedure aimed at exoneration.  
The second concerns the determination of whether the exoneree satisfies the 
requirements of the state compensation statute.  The third piece deals with the 
award of state compensation to those qualified to receive it.  At steps two and 
three, an opportunity exists to construct a compensatory regime less adversar-
ial, less time consuming, and more even-handed than most state statutes cur-
rently in place.  That reconstruction should thoughtfully borrow from certain 
statutory design elements of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Pro-
gram and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, as well as sound 
elements of certain existing state wrongful conviction compensation statutes. 
A.  A New Funding Mechanism 
Paralleling the funding mechanism of the National Vaccine Injury Com-
pensation Program, states should create Wrongful Conviction Trust Funds.310  
They should be funded with an initial lump sum deposit sufficient to cover 
potential awards of current premature and pending claims.  Going forward, 
each state should make per-capita contributions based on the number of indi-
viduals committed to state incarceration each year, and they should account the 
expected number of future eligible claimants and anticipated pay-outs, includ-
ing the costs of social and other services awarded to the exoneree. 
As described above, existing state data on annual incarcerations and data 
from the National Registry of Exonerations offer state budgetary officials a 
solid quantitative basis for determining an appropriate per-incarceration trust 
fund deposit amount given the contours of the state compensation statute.  That 
amount can be adjusted over time if the number of qualified exonerees, number 
 
 310. Louisiana appears to be the only state with an explicit, statutorily created In-
nocence Compensation Fund dedicated to making awards under its state statute.  The 
Fund consists of appropriated funds, donations, grants, and “other monies which may 
become available.”  LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8.N(1) (West 2017). 
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of state incarcerees, or the returns on the money in the trust deviate from ex-
pectation.311  
This sort of pay-as-you-go approach to financing wrongful conviction 
compensation trust funds may relieve states of the budgetary worry of rare but 
unexpected and large payouts, which make low prescribed awards and caps 
fiscally prudent but inadequately compensatory.  On the expense side, as dis-
cussed below, states should be permitted (as many now are) to pay exonerees 
in installments.312   A reasonably constant and predictable annual deposit to the 
Trust Fund, and installment payments to exonerees from the Trust Fund, are 
better and fairer ways of controlling the financial risks states now face than 
prescribed awards and caps.  That reduction of risk and uncertainty provides 
states the breathing room necessary to increase the generosity of compensation 
payments to qualified exonerees. 
Moreover, a Trust Fund could also avoid delays inherent in states, like 
California and Illinois, that require cumbersome legislative appropriation of 
recommended awards.313  In those states, qualified exonerees risk being caught 
in political budget battles.  A particularly bitter one in Illinois has caused sub-
stantial delays in making payments authorized by the Illinois Court of 
Claims.314  Of course, the annual appropriation to a state Trust Fund could suf-
fer a similar fate, but the possibility of such difficulty could be factored into 
earlier appropriation metrics to permit a cash cushion or partial payments.  The 
 
 311. Taking Ohio again as an example, the average annual payout from 1989 to 
2016 under existing law was just over $760,986 per year.  In calendar year 2016, 19,895 
persons were committed to Ohio prisons.  CRAIG BERNIE, BUREAU OF RESEARCH & 
EVALUATION, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION: CALENDAR 
YEAR 2016 COMMITMENT REPORT 2 (2017), http://www.drc.ohio.gov/Por-
tals/0/Reentry/Reports/Commitment%20Re-
ports/CY2016%20COMMITMENT%20REPORT.pdf?ver=2017-03-10-103733-650.  
A deposit in the trust fund of $38.25 per prisoner would approximate the amount re-
quired.  In Ohio, as elsewhere, the numbers of persons imprisoned per year is dropping, 
suggesting that increased deposits would be needed. 
 312. The Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice, for example, prepares annual reports of disbursements from the Fund.  See Inno-
cence Compensation Program, LA. COMM’N ON L. ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. CRIM. 
JUST., http://lcle.la.gov/programs/innocence_compensation.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 
2017).  It reports that, in nearly all cases, successful claimants are paid $25,000 per 
year, rendering total annual payments relatively constant.  LA. COMM’N ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INNOCENCE COMPENSATION FUND 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016), http://www.lcle.la.gov/programs/up-
loads/2016_Innocence_Compensation_Fund_Report.pdf. 
 313. Similarly, in Alabama and Virginia, there is no entitlement to compensation.  
Payment is contingent on legislative approval, which can be denied.  ALA. CODE § 29-
2-165 (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(A) (West 2017).  Even if the particular 
awards do not require individual legislative approval, payments can be delayed by gen-
eral state budgetary impasses.  See Bowean, supra note 237. 
 314. Bowean, supra note 237. 
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result, while perhaps not ideal, would be substantially better than the months 
of delay experienced by qualified exonerees in Illinois. 
B.  Efficient Transition Between Exoneration and Compensation 
It is striking, as Table 1 shows, that 576, or 38.17%, of exonerees in states 
now with compensation statutes did not file a claim for state compensation.  In 
Part III.C, I offered a number of explanations for why a substantial number of 
exonerees do not file state claims for compensation.  The easiest fixes are to 
eliminate unnecessary substantive disqualifiers, such as barring from compen-
sation those exonerated on grounds other than DNA, those exonerated but not 
receiving a pardon from the governor, those who pled guilty to the crime, or 
those exonerees with prior felony convictions. 
Procedure may explain other non-filings.  The prototypical compensation 
statute fundamentally involves two pieces of litigation: the post-conviction 
criminal proceeding, resulting in relief under circumstances that may qualify 
one for entry on the Registry, and a separate civil case in which the factual 
basis for the exoneration must be reproved.  A similar battle is fought twice, 
and a state that concedes criminal relief may fight civil compensation.315  A 
more seamless process would be one in which the court granting post-convic-
tion relief on grounds of innocence, or grounds consistent with innocence, 
would render findings of fact in a certificate of innocence that includes certain 
recitals necessary for civil compensation.  Such findings would automatically 
be forwarded to and/or would be binding on the appropriate state civil com-
pensation authority. 
California, which historically has had a high non-filing rate, amended its 
statute in 2014 along these lines for some cases.316  Generally, the award of a 
declaration of factual innocence by a court or through the stipulation of a pros-
ecutor obviates the need for a compensation hearing and is sufficient grounds 
to recommend payment (which is statutorily prescribed in California) of a com-
pensation claim.317  At least as to the category of California claims covered by 
 
 315. Jenifer McKim, Moral Debt: What Happens When the State Overturns a Con-
viction, but Fights the Payout, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2016, 2:32 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/moral-debt-what-happens-when-the-state-over-
turns-a-conviction-but-fights-the-payout_us_584edeb2e4b0e05aded4d371 (describing 
the case of Kevin O’Loughlin). 
 316. California Improves Compensation Process for Wrongfully Convicted Prison-
ers, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (May 19, 2014), https://www.prisonlegal-
news.org/news/2014/may/19/california-improves-compensation-process-wrongfully-
convicted-prisoners/. 
 317. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.865 (West 2017).  Similarly, if a court grants a writ 
of habeas corpus, vacates a judgment of conviction, and finds that the petition unques-
tionably points to innocence, that finding is binding on the California Victim Compen-
sation Board, the administrative body that adjudicates claims for compensation for 
wrongful conviction. Id. § 1485.55(a).  See also id. § 4902(a) (in such cases, the Board 
will calculate the award within 30 days and recommend that the legislature pay it).  
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this provision, one should expect 100% filing and, so long as the legislature 
approves and appropriates the award, 100% grant rates. 
In Illinois, those convicted of crimes they did not commit may file a state 
court action in which they seek a certificate of innocence.318  If granted (there 
appears to be only 2 of 107 claims denied in Illinois), the certificate is auto-
matically transferred to the Illinois Court of Claims.319  As a matter of practice 
after the Illinois statute was amended in 2008, those claims supported by a cer-
tificate of innocence are docketed and quickly approved for payment by the 
court, without the need for further evidentiary presentation.320 
Ohio takes a similarly proactive approach.  When the trial court deter-
mines that an individual is wrongfully imprisoned, it notifies the clerk of the 
Ohio Court of Claims within 7 days.321  Within 60 days of the trial court’s 
determination, the Clerk of the Ohio Court of Claims requests that one-half of 
the statutory amount be paid to the exoneree.322  If the individual fails to file a 
claim for the balance with the Ohio Court of Claims within 6 months, the clerk 
is directed to send periodic reminder letters thereafter.323 
States without an automatic notification to the entity that awards claims 
should provide exonerees with notice of the opportunity to file a claim with the 
state.  Texas’s notice statute is the best in the country in this regard.  It requires 
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to notify individuals determined to 
be wrongfully imprisoned, both in writing and orally, of the right to make a 
claim, with guidance on how to do it, and it recommends non-profit advocacy 
groups that might provide assistance.324  The goal of these statutes is laudable 
and should be replicated – to simplify and accelerate the procedural require-
ments of making claims and to reduce the incidence of procedural default. 
Another way to reduce the rate of non-filing, particularly in states that 
require claimants to seek compensation judicially rather than administratively, 
 
Claims for compensation that do not rely on a declaration of factual innocence or such 
a writ are decided by the Board following an evidentiary hearing.  Id. § 4903(a).  The 
D.C. Mayor’s proposed amendment to the D.C. Act similarly requires a certificate of 
innocence to be filed with an executive branch officer, the Chief Risk Officer, and im-
plies that compensation would be paid upon receipt of additional documents required 
in the proposed statute or by the Chief Risk Officer.  FY 2018 Budget Support Act of 
2017, B22-244, Subtit. C, § 1022. 
 318. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-702(a) (West 2017). 
 319. Id. 5/2-702(h). 
 320. E-mail from Karen Daniel, Dir., Northwestern Law Sch. Ctr. on Wrongful 
Convictions, to author (Dec. 7, 2016) (on file with author). 
 321. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(B)(3) (West 2017). 
 322. Id. § 2743.48(B)(4). 
 323. Id. § 2743.48(C)(2).  Despite this statute, Ohio’s non-filing rate remains above 
the national average. 
 324. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.102 (West 2017).  Over half of 
Texas’s non-filers were exonerated before the overhaul of the Texas compensation stat-
ute in 2009, which included this notice provision.  See also IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 
663A.3, 663.A.4 (West 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5577 (West 2017) (providing 
notice). 
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is to include an attorneys’ fees provision in the statute.  From a compensatory 
perspective, exonerees should be made whole to the extent possible, as the sev-
eral states with fees provisions recognize.  There is no need to go as far as the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act goes in awarding the losing claimant 
attorneys’ fees.  But, an attorneys’ fees provision may encourage attorneys to 
represent claimants, especially those with potentially modest claims because 
they were incarcerated relatively briefly.  Florida has, as noted, an extremely 
high non-filing rate, and its explicit bar on state payment of attorneys’ fees and 
criminalization of private fee arrangements in these cases make a highly re-
strictive statute even worse.325 
As suggested earlier, it is possible that other non-filers who were con-
victed in states that adopted compensation statutes after their exonerations ei-
ther did not become aware of or were disqualified due to subsequent convic-
tions or death.  Additional states adopting compensation statutes should, as 
many of the newer statutes do, provide prior state exonerees an opportunity to 
seek compensation retroactively.  The state should be able to identify such in-
dividuals, and most, or all, should be listed in the Registry.  The state should 
affirmatively notify the exoneree and his or her criminal defense attorney of 
the right to seek compensation under the new statute. 
In sum, states with high numbers of non-filers, particularly non-filers who 
were incarcerated for a significant period of time, should revisit their statutes.  
Table 1 helps identify such states, many of which appear not to have analyzed 
their statutes from this perspective.  That reexamination should assess whether 
non-filing might be attributed to substantive statutory barriers and/or proce-
dural issues.  A number of states have, in contrast, taken steps to more seam-
lessly bridge the transition from exoneration to compensation.  Those efforts 
can fairly easily be replicated to reduce other states’ non-filing rates. 
C.  Permission to Pursue Other Claims 
Recall that the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund offered an 
election of remedies on two levels.  First, claimants could choose a remedy 
through the Fund or proceed to litigation against private defendants in the 
Southern District of New York, with a cap on damages corresponding to insur-
ance coverage.  Second, having chosen the Fund, the claimant could accept the 
presumed award or seek to enhance it by showing “extraordinary circum-
stances,” thereby permitting an element of individualized determination. 
Adapted to this context, that election of remedy should be modified in 
one respect.  Claimants who proceed under the state compensation statute 
should not be precluded from seeking damages under tort or civil rights theo-
ries against other defendants, such as police officers, counties, or other munic-
ipalities.326  Of course, many exonerees will not file such suits because of the 
 
 325. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 961.056(5)(b) (West 2017); id. § 961.06(e). 
 326. Such is the case in several states.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-
103(9)(b) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8(k) (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
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lack of evidence of misconduct, the presence of immunity defenses, the inabil-
ity to find an attorney or to fund a lawsuit, or a preference to devote the time 
and energy needed for litigation on other pursuits. 
But for those with viable civil rights and tort claims, and the means and 
inclination to pursue them, a non-preclusive statute would help relieve the ev-
ident anguish Professor Hadfield uncovered when September 11th claimants 
were forced to elect between seeking compensation through the Fund or 
through traditional litigation.  Many struggled between accepting compensa-
tion and pursuing claims through litigation, as litigation might uncover facts 
that could possibly assign blame or responsibility on accountable third par-
ties.327  A majority resented that the Fund required a waiver of such claims in 
exchange for compensation.328 
In this context, preclusion could tend to drive most claimants to less gen-
erous, but more certain, no-fault state compensation and away from potentially 
more generous, but less certain, civil rights and torts cases.  That choice im-
poses real social costs.  Civil rights and other suits can serve to identify rogue 
officers, dishonest forensic examiners, or suspect investigative practices that 
have led to wrongful convictions.  Such lawsuits have led to additional exon-
erations and advances in investigative procedure, which will reduce wrongful 
convictions in the future.  Other than governmental repose, the only real justi-
fication supporting preclusion is to avoid duplicative recovery, and that prob-
lem can, as discussed below, be dealt with through offsetting. 
D.  Election of State Remedies 
Similar to the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, but absent 
from all current state compensation statutes, the statute itself should offer a 
choice.  In Option A, states should create generous, but fiscally measurable,329 
 
ANN. § 691.1755(8) (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4608 (West 2017) (may 
make other claims against parties other than the state).  A number of states, however, 
explicitly preclude, in whole or in part, those seeking or receiving state statutory awards 
from seeking alternative remedies for wrongful conviction.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(g) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 961.06(5), (6)(a) (appli-
cation for compensation under state statute requires a release of all claims arising from 
wrongful conviction; claimant may not apply for compensation if there is a pending 
lawsuit); IOWA CODE ANN. § 669.10; MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(4) (West 2017) 
(claimant receiving award under statute may not obtain award under Mississippi Tort 
Claims Act); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.12(B) (West 2017) (same); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4.100.080(1) (West 2017) (claimant waives relief against state, subdivision, or 
employees under any legal theory arising from wrongful conviction). 
 327. See Hadfield, supra note 298, at 646–49. 
 328. Id. at 668. 
 329. In Massachusetts, the total package of services and monetary compensation 
cannot exceed $500,000, demonstrating that the monetary value of non-monetary re-
dress is ascertainable.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5(a) (West 2017).  The 
potential costs of these items can be factored into the state’s calculation of an appropri-
ate per-capita deposit into the state’s Wrongful Conviction Compensation Trust Fund. 
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compensation packages, from which claimants can select elements that are 
suited to their needs.  The remedial packages should permit an exonerated per-
son, after consultation with a state-designated reentry specialist or a profes-
sional of his or her own choosing, to select among an a la carte menu of reme-
dial options.  Alternatively, in Option B, exonerated claimants should be per-
mitted to sue the state.  That option would look much like the D.C. Act, in 
which liability is no-fault and compensation is uncapped and tort-based. 
Recall the respective backgrounds of Kirk Odom and Donald Gates.  Mr. 
Odom was exonerated nearly a decade after his release from prison; he had 
married, started a small business, qualified for medical insurance, and rented 
an affordable apartment with his family.  Mr. Gates was exonerated and re-
leased simultaneously after being incarcerated for over 27 years; he had no 
resources for housing, transportation, or a host of other urgent personal needs.  
Based on their personal circumstances, preferences, and inclinations, ex-
onerees like them should be permitted to choose between a prescribed basket 
of compensation and support options and a traditional uncapped litigation op-
tion.  The former should include: 
1. Transitional housing for an appropriate period of time and assistance 
accessing mortgage financing for a home thereafter; 
2. State-provided medical and dental insurance to cover treatment 
and therapy for conditions causally connected to their incarceration 
for an appropriate period of time; 
3. Vocational and employment training services; 
4. Time-limited transportation vouchers; 
5. Expedited provision of state-issued identification cards; 
6. Tuition benefits at public universities or state educational institu-
tions; 
7. Tuition benefits for children born prior to or during the wrongful 
incarceration at public universities or other state educational institu-
tions;330 
 
 330. Only Colorado currently provides tuition benefits for the children of the exon-
erated, provided the children were conceived or adopted prior to the incarceration and 
the exonerated parent was incarcerated for at least 3 years.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13-65-103(2)(E)(II). 
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8. State payment of child support arrearages accrued during the period 
of incarceration;331 
9. Low-interest state loans through existing state programs to begin a 
small business or a non-profit organization;332 
10.  Other services demonstrated by the claimant to be necessary to fa-
cilitate his or her particular reentry into the community;333 
11.  Reimbursement for costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and expenses 
associated with criminal defense and post-conviction relief; 
12.  Reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in advancing the civil claim; 
13.  Recovery of lost wages and other economic losses; 
14.  Expungement of the wrongful conviction;334 
15.  An immediate bridge payment to reentering exonerees for adequate 
living expenses until the full package is received; 
16.  A non-taxable,335 pro-rata presumed, non-economic damage award 
of $200,000 per year of incarceration, doubled for time served on death 
row, and adjusted for inflation; and 
 
 331. Only Colorado and Texas provide for payment of child support arrearages.  Id. 
§ 13-65-103(2)(E)(III); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.051(a)(6) (West 
2017). 
 332. No state presently offers such loans.  The exonerated, however, are, either be-
cause of their record (if not expunged), or because of a period of unemployment, frozen 
out of the credit market.  See INNOCENCE PROJECT, Making Up for Lost Time, supra 
note 13, at 17.  States paying claimants on an installment basis might consider periodic 
loan repayments coming out of those installments. 
 333. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(e) (West 2017). 
 334. The statutes of several states – Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Missouri, and Washington – provide for expungement or sealing.  See 
Jack Healy, Wrongfully Convicted Often Find Their Record, Unexpunged, Haunts 
Them, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (May 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/us/wrongfully-
convicted-find-their-record-haunts-them.html. 
 335. The statutes of California, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New 
Jersey, Vermont, and Washington explicitly state that the award to the plaintiff (except, 
for some, any award of attorneys’ fees) is not taxable.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-65-103(6)(b); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 661B-3(g) (West 2017); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5(d) (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(3)(b) (West 
2017).  Wrongful conviction awards are not taxable by the federal government.  26 
U.S.C.A. 139F (West 2017). 
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17.  A presumed non-economic damage award of $75,000 per year for 
time served post-release on probation, on parole, and/or as a registered 
sex offender.336 
Most of these items are already part of at least one state’s statute, but no 
state offers such a comprehensive set of services and remedies.  Moreover, 
many states make some of this support available to reentering citizens on parole 
or probation but disqualify the exonerated from receiving them because they 
are no longer supervised by the state.337  A number of states have recognized 
what should be obvious – that for some exonerees, the successful reintegration 
into society will require the prompt and efficient provision of the kinds of so-
cial services commonly viewed as part of a humane social safety net.338 
Particularly for those exonerated and released from incarceration at the 
same time, transitional housing, access to public transportation, and state-is-
sued identification are immediately essential.  There is very commonly a need 
for prompt and ongoing medical, dental, and psychological treatment for con-
ditions caused by the wrongful conviction.  Less urgent, but crucial in the short-
term, are vocational training, job placement, and educational support to assist 
the exonerated in reentering the workforce.  Entry into the job market is often 
made more difficult with a criminal record, making expungement of the wrong-
ful conviction necessary. 
It makes no sense for states to provide reentry support and services to 
those who were correctly convicted and released from custody but to deny them 
to the wrongly convicted.  States owe the innocent more, not less, than the 
guilty.  That obligation should extend to those forms of relief which, in the 
view of the exoneree and reentry specialist, will best put that person on the path 
to restoring the life he or she might have had.  Depending on the length of the 
incarceration and the nature of the harm experienced while in custody, the cost 
of doing so will be greater for some exonerees than others. 
States can, however, be creative in controlling those costs in a manner 
that is both fiscally responsible and mindful of the restorative purpose of these 
efforts.  For example, states might reasonably require individuals to be incar-
cerated for a certain period of time before they are eligible for certain forms of 
 
 336. To prevent the premature depletion of this money, state law should require at 
least half of these damage awards to be invested in annuities offered by safe and estab-
lished life insurance companies. 
 337. Evan J. Mandery et al., Compensation Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offend-
ing, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 578 (2013). 
 338. Surveys of the exonerated show that significant numbers suffer from mental 
health conditions, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression and 
are financially dependent on others.  Heather Weigand, Rebuilding a Life: The Wrong-
fully Convicted and Exonerated, 18 PUB. INT. L.J. 427, 428 (2009) (summarizing results 
of a survey of 60 exonerees by The Life After Exoneration Program). 
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relief.339  Of the 1900 individuals convicted in state courts on the Registry of 
Exonerations as of March 1, 2017, 474 served 2 or fewer years in prison.340  
States might determine that persons who were wrongfully incarcerated com-
paratively briefly do not merit, for example, tuition benefits and housing assis-
tance.  In addition, so long as the caps are adequate to provide meaningful sup-
port and services, and an opportunity exists to petition for additional assistance 
in cases of demonstrated need, states could consider capping the costs of par-
ticular services or particular combinations of services, as Minnesota has 
done.341 
At the same time, wrongful conviction can be financially costly.  Some 
of the exonerated have paid court costs, criminal penalties, and attorneys’ fees 
associated with their wrongful conviction and post-conviction proceedings.  
Those should be reimbursed.  Some may leave prison with substantial unpaid 
child support arrearages.  And, as is the case with the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program, make-whole relief requires that the state pay the attor-
neys’ fees for reasonable time devoted to representing the exonerated in seek-
ing that civil redress.342 
Last, those exonerees who were incarcerated long-term, in particular, 
have been deprived of the opportunity to make a legacy.  For many families, 
that involves assisting a child in going college.  For others, it may be the pur-
chase of a home or creation of a small business.  The opportunity for a legacy 
should be restored to the exonerated.  Offering children of the exonerated an 
opportunity to go to state colleges or universities has little marginal cost for the 
state and potentially high benefit for the children and their families.  If a viable 
business plan is presented, states should provide the exonerated with low-in-
come loans, in connection with existing small business development programs.  
The lack of a credit history may similarly require the state to assist the exoneree 
in obtaining a mortgage to purchase a home, perhaps payable from annual com-
pensation payments. 
In short, should the exoneree elect Option A, the determination of what 
combination of support and services would best serve his or her needs should 
be the product of a collaborative and ongoing relationship between the state 
and the exoneree and counsel.  That relationship will, it is hoped, increase the 
likelihood of a successful reentry and meaningfully satisfy the state’s moral 
obligation to help those it has so grievously harmed. 
 
 339. Colorado’s tuition waiver for the exonerated and custodial children, for exam-
ple, applies only if the wrongful incarceration was for at least 3 years.  COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(2)(E)(II)(B). 
 340. COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107. 
 341. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365 subdiv. 3 (West 2017). 
 342. Although the provisions vary, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin per-
mit the recovery of attorneys’ fees to some degree from the state. 
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E.  The Annual Award 
Of these proposals, the one likely to be the most controversial is the 
$200,000 per-year award.343  It should not be.  Table 1 shows that the current 
average annual payment per incarcerated exoneree in states with statutes is just 
under $27,000 per year of incarceration and just over $23,700 nationally.344  To 
be sure, that number will creep upwards if currently pending cases are decided 
in the exoneree’s favor.  There are, however, only 65 pending cases.  And, that 
number will increase as cases now coded as “premature” are filed and awards 
are made.  However, a substantial number of those are brief incarcerations for 
Texas drug possession convictions.  Even if those numbers increase, they will 
not likely exceed lost wages for a fairly low wage worker.  That means, on 
average, there is effectively no compensation for the extraordinary non-eco-
nomic harms suffered by the wrongly convicted.  No fair-minded person would 
argue that the wrongly convicted are entitled to no damages for their loss of 
liberty. 
Not only are these figures discouragingly low, but they stand in striking 
contrast to awards in recent judgments in state compensation cases without 
caps and federal civil rights cases arising from wrongful conviction.  Placed in 
that context, $200,000 per year is half of that awarded to Mr. Tribble and one-
fifth of that provided to Mr. Newton, whose $1 million per year of incarceration 
now stands at the higher range of such awards.345 
Let’s put this proposal in broader context.  If the next 2000 exonerees 
placed on the Registry also average 8.7 years lost to wrongful conviction (as 
the last 2000 have), the total cost, at $200,000 per year, would be 
$3,480,000,000.  That figure is slightly less than the $3,619,000,000 paid by 
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Fund since 1989346 and less than 
half of the approximately $7 billion paid by the September 11th Victim Com-
pensation Fund.347  Even if it took 20 years to arrive at the next 2000 exonerees, 
rather than the 28 years it took for first 2000, the cost would be $174,000,000 
annually, or about $3.5 million per year for each of the 50 states.348 
 
 343. After I developed this proposal, the D.C. Mayor’s budget bill proposed a 
$200,000 per-year compensation metric.  FY 2018 Budget Support Act of 2017, B22-
244, Subtit. C, § 1022.  See also supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 344. See infra Table 1. 
 345. Tribble v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super. 
LEXIS 4, at *81 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016); Newton v. City of New York, No. 07 
Civ. 6211, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34594, *177 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2016). 
 346. See supra Part V.A. 
 347. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 98–99 (nearly $6 billion paid in claims for de-
ceased victims and $1.05 billion paid for physical injury victims). 
 348. According to the Registry, the average number of years lost to wrongful incar-
ceration by the first 2000 exonerees wrongly convicted in both state and federal court 
is 8.7 years.  COMPLETE NAT’L REGISTRY, supra note 107.  Admittedly, I have excluded 
the additional compensation for post-release time or parole, probation, or as a registered 
sex offender and for reimbursements and services provided by the states. 
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In reality, the actual amount is likely to be considerably less.  Some states 
will continue not to have compensation statutes.  There will continue to be 
some, but hopefully less, non-filing.  Some claims will continue to be denied.  
If additional states require the exonerated to repay compensation received from 
the state from amounts received in federal civil rights settlements or judgments, 
the price tag is further reduced.  All told, when viewed from this broader per-
spective, the need for enhanced awards is clearer, and the costs of them are 
surprisingly modest. 
My case-by-case review of awards in state statutory compensation cases 
reveals another profoundly unsettling aspect of these awards.  There is extraor-
dinary variation in compensation, with many exonerees receiving nothing, 
while others receive sizeable awards.  To be sure, variation is not uncommon 
in tort law, but unlike tort law, the primary compensatory metric used by most 
states is a standard multiplication problem – dollars per years served.  The con-
siderable differences among states in assigning a dollar-per-year value results, 
as shown earlier, in vastly different values placed on a year of lost liberty de-
pending on the state of conviction.  Connecticut values that year 165 times 
greater than Wisconsin.  No fair compensatory system would have such a re-
sult.  While a purpose of this Article is to encourage individual states to reex-
amine their statutes, this extraordinary variation suggests that a national review 
is in order and should have as a primary goal reducing this unsettling inequal-
ity. 
It is true that these preliminary calculations exclude the costs of the pro-
posed social and other services.  Costs will also increase to the extent that ex-
onerees select the unbounded litigation option, Option B, and win more than 
the $200,000-per-year threshold.   However, if states adopt this proposed elec-
tion of remedy framework, they will have some interest in steering claimants 
into Option A.  The judge overseeing and the Special Master administering the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund applied some pressure on appli-
cants to seek compensation through the Fund.349  They were very successful in 
achieving that goal, with 97% doing so.350  That task was made easier because 
Special Master Feinberg and his team made the Fund an appealing option by 
using flexible and informal procedures, an expedited resolution process, and 
reasonably generous and administratively efficient compensation metrics.351  
States would be well-advised to pursue the same approach and make Option A 
substantively and procedurally attractive. 
F.  Avoidance of Lump Sum Payments and Offset 
Implicit in many state compensation statutes is the worry that newly freed, 
wrongfully convicted individuals may spend a large amount of money un-
 
 349. FEINBERG, supra note 269, at 1. 
 350. Id. at 75. 
 351. Id. at 1, 81. 
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wisely.  Only Colorado requires the awardee to take a personal financial man-
agement course,352 but many other states permit or require the compensation to 
be paid to an annuity company or directly to the exoneree in installments.353 
Acceptance of installment payments is a reasonable exchange for en-
hanced generosity.  Such payments enforce, albeit paternalistically, a measure 
of spending discipline while regularizing state payments from their Trust 
Funds.  Provisions, however, should be made for an opportunity to request and 
receive a lump sum or larger installment payments in compelling situations.354 
Offsets are another reasonable price to be paid to encourage states to enact 
more progressive compensation statutes.  In the District of Columbia, courts 
have ruled that the state compensation award is not offset by any settlement 
reached in claims against the federal government.355  In New York, two recent 
federal courts have similarly ruled that civil rights awards should not be offset 
 
 352. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-103(2)(F) (West 2017) (exoneree must com-
plete a financial management course to receive more than one annual payment). 
 353. ALA. CODE § 29-2-160(a) (2017) (may pay in installments); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-3-114(1)(a) (annual payments of $100,000 adjusted for inflation); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 961.06(4) (West 2017) (annuity for entire amount awarded); LA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 15-572.8(H)(2), (O) (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-
501(c) (West 2017) (lump sum or installments); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 
5(A) (West 2017) (lump sum or annuity installments); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
691.1755(6) (West 2017) (lump sum or installment); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-44-7(2)(a) 
(West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.058.1(4) (West 2017) (no award of more than 
$36,500 per year); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-5(a)(2) (West 2017) (court may order an-
nuity if damages exceed $1 million); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (West 2017) 
(monthly installments unless lump sum award is warranted; lump sum may be funded 
by annuity); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.053(a) (West 2017) (claimant 
entitled to annuity); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405(2)(d) (West 2017) (allocations 
made so that the amount is paid within 10 years); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(B) 
(West 2017) (lump sum of 20%; remainder by annuity); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
4.100.060(11) (West 2017) (claimant or attorney general may initiate and agree to a 
structured settlement). 
 354. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(D) (claimant can seek lump sum pay-
ment upon showing of special needs; Board will consider if lump sum is in the best 
interests of the person and whether he or she can wisely manage and control the pay-
ment).  Motivated by a desire to help an exoneree purchase a home, the Colorado leg-
islature recently passed Senate Bill 17-125, which permits exonerees to elect to receive 
the balance of the award in a lump sum if certain conditions are met.  S. 17-125, 71st 
Gen Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (allowing certain persons who have been 
exonerated of crimes to receive in lump sum payments compensation that is owed to 
them by the state). 
 355. The D.C. Superior Court in both Odom and Tribble held that prior settlements 
with the federal government could not be offset against state awards because the City 
Council expressed in the legislative history that the remedies be cumulative.  Tribble v. 
District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-003237-B, 2016 D.C. Super. LEXIS 4, at *24–25 
(D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2016); Odom v. District of Columbia, No. 2013-CA-3239, 
2015 D.C. Super. LEXIS 2, at *57–58 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2015). 
65
Gutman: An Empirical Reexamination
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
434 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
by earlier state compensation settlements.356  Other states, however, make the 
offset requirement explicit.  Colorado, for example, requires state compensa-
tion recipients to repay the state amounts received in subsequent cases arising 
from the wrongful conviction.357 
If, as I propose, exonerees are permitted to pursue both state compensa-
tion and other remedies, then it is not unfair to impose an offset, whereby the 
state compensation is repaid in whole or in part by a subsequent civil rights or 
tort award.  The latter sort of offset could significantly reduce state payouts in 
these kinds of cases. 
G.  Procedural Efficiency and Expedition 
Should the qualified exonerated claimant358 wish to select Option A, he 
or she would apply to the director of the state Trust Fund for that remedial 
package.  Selected remedial items should be promptly provided by a date set 
by statute.  If the state imposes a prescribed amount or if the claimant selects 
one, there is no reason why such an administrative entity cannot quickly award 
it.  Texas offers a sound approach to expediency.  There, a claimant files an 
application with the judiciary section of the Texas Comptroller of Public Ac-
counts.359  The Comptroller is required to make a determination of eligibility 
and compensation within 45 days.360  If granted, the compensation is paid 
 
 356. Federal courts in New York have held that, under New York law, New York 
state compensation settlements should not be offset from subsequent civil rights 
awards.  Peacock v. City of Rochester, No. 6:13-cv-6046-MAT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103544, at *16–19 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2016); Restivo v. Nassau Co., Civ. No. 06-cv-
6720, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188474, at *23–29 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2014).  The ra-
tionale of those decisions was that the state and county actors were not joint tortfeasors 
and that the state share of liability in § 1983 actions was zero.  Restivo, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 188474, at *28–29; Peacock, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103544, at *19.  Nor was 
there a double recovery because the rule against double recovery applies only to judg-
ment, not settlements.  Restivo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188474, at *10; Peacock, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103544, at *19. 
 357. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1-114(6), (7); 13-65-103(8)(a) (offsets 
award under statute by recovery in another civil action against the state or other gov-
ernmental entity arising from the wrongful conviction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.365, 
subdiv. 5 (West 2017) (future damages resulting from action by claimant against state 
or political subdivision are offset by award under state statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
52:4C-2(b) (award of damages against state, subdivision, or employee are offset by 
award under Act). 
 358. Those in receipt of a certificate of innocence or similar document with statu-
torily required recitals should be deemed automatically qualified.  See ALA. CODE § 29-
2-165(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.368; VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10(A). 
 359. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.051(a) (West 2017). 
 360. Id. § 103.051(c). 
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within 30 days.361  Unlike some state statutes with deadlines, Texas wisely im-
poses deadlines on an Executive Branch administrator to decide the merits of 
the claim and to make the award.362  For those selecting the remedial package, 
remedies selected should be provided separately.  A calculation of lost wages, 
for example, may require a presentation by an economic expert and may take 
some time.  That showing should not delay the provision of other needed fi-
nancial support and social services.363 
That is not to say, however, that the award package can escape all contro-
versy.  It is easy to foresee disputes over the appropriate lost wage calculation.  
One can also imagine situations in which there is dispute as to whether the 
exoneree needs or would benefit from particular services.  Is transitional hous-
ing needed if the exoneree is living with family members?  Is a college tuition 
voucher useful for someone with significant educational or cognitive issues?  
When is a proposal for a low-interest state loan sufficiently viable to warrant 
the loan?  There is evidence of even low-level compensatory disputes in the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program that have introduced delay 
and adversarialism in that process.364  Why would this be any different when, 
for instance, a state reentry specialist and a social worker of the exoneree’s 
choosing disagree on the elements of the basket of supports and services ap-
propriate for a qualified exoneree? 
There is no reason to create a mechanism for solving a problem that may 
not exist.  A number of states offer particular supports and services.  It is not at 
all clear that these kinds of disputes have in fact materialized in these cases.  If 
they do, however, it should be possible to appoint a judge to promptly adjudi-
cate them without the possibility of appeal and without delaying receipt of the 
services about which there is no dispute.365 
Critics might point to the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
as an example of one program in which statutory deadlines are routinely 
missed, casting doubt on whether they could be met here.  One important dif-
ference is that the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is a national 
 
 361. Id. § 103.051(a). 
 362. Id. §§ 103.051(a), (c). 
 363. Ohio and Utah take unusually proactive approaches to the issue of prompt pay-
ment.  In Ohio, within 60 days of a judicial determination of wrongful imprisonment, 
the court of claims will request payment of a preliminary judgment of half of the 
amount expected to be paid.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48B(B)(3) (West 2017).  
Utah will pay 20% of the payment owed or 2 years’ worth of incarceration, whichever 
is higher, within 45 days of a court determination of actual innocence.  UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-9-405(2)(a) (West 2017).  Texas and Virginia offer interim awards, but 
there is no deadline for their payment.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.102(b)(3) (West 
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.11(C). 
 364. Engstrom, supra note 240, at 1692. 
 365. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-65-101(7) (West 2017) (if the claimant ap-
peals a jury award, the court may direct the state administrator to pay the petitioner 
pending appeal). 
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program with a single point of entry.  In fiscal year 2016, 1120 claims for com-
pensation were filed.366  In this context, claims would be filed in states with 
statutes, and the volume per state would be dramatically less.  That reduces the 
possibility of delay due to high volume.  That lower state volume may make 
easier enforcement of tight statutory deadlines. 
H.  The Unbounded Litigation Option 
The qualified exoneree should not, however, be required to select the re-
medial package.  Some claimants may not regard the package of services and 
reimbursements to be particularly useful and, like some applicants seeking 
compensation through the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, may 
believe that their particular circumstances warrant a departure upward from the 
presumptive $200,000-per-year value.  They may believe, for example, that a 
serious illness or injury and a resulting diminished life expectancy are causally 
related to their wrongful incarceration and seek additional compensation for 
that particular loss. 
For compensatory or other reasons, they may wish for an opportunity to 
express publicly the depth of their suffering or, if regarded as relevant by the 
state,367 to use this litigation to expose evidence of misconduct.  They should 
be permitted to do so in an expedited procedure before a state judge, sitting 
with or without a jury, selected by the chief justice of the state supreme court.368  
That process will be lengthier, involving traditional civil discovery and expert 
witnesses.  There should be no cap, and reasonable attorneys’ fees at prevailing 
market rates in the state should be awarded to prevailing claimants. 
No state currently offers this kind of election of remedy.  The wrongly 
convicted were, during their incarceration, largely denied the freedom to 
choose.  There is something particularly appropriate about permitting qualified 
exonerees an opportunity, with counsel, to consider their individual circum-
stances and to choose the remedial option that best suits their needs and pref-
erences.  Choice, even if necessarily limited, navigates a path between a pre-
scribed and capped award, which ignores individual circumstances, and the sort 
of adversarial litigation Kirk Odom and Santae Tribble experienced.  Choice, 
which allows for the collaboration between reentry specialists, attorneys as 
counselors, and other professionals to assist in the decision-making, may help 
at least some of the exonerated obtain what they need to rebuild their lives.  
 
 366. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADM’R, supra note 255, at 6. 
 367. Connecticut appears to be the only state that explicitly accounts for the negli-
gence or misconduct of governmental agents in assessing the amount of compensation.  
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102uu(d) (West 2017).  Claims Commissioner decisions 
in 4 cases supplemented the award based on this factor.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 258D, § 5 (West 2017) (court may consider “particular circumstances of . . . trial 
and other proceedings”). 
 368. In Minnesota, the chief justice appoints a compensation panel of 3 attorneys 
or judges to determine the amount of damages to be awarded.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
611.363 subdiv. 1 (West 2017). 
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And, choice helps states better discharge their moral obligations which under-
score these statutes.  To be sure, states may, like Special Master Feinberg, ease 
that choice by making the collaborative option extremely attractive to ex-
onerees through generosity, flexibility, and efficiency.  That would not be a 
bad outcome. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Most fair-minded people would be outraged if the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund precluded certain victims who resided in certain states 
from seeking compensation; if 38% of the potentially eligible did not apply at 
all; if only 44% of the victims were compensated; if those compensated for 
similar injuries were awarded widely varying amounts based on random fortu-
ity like state residence; if the average compensatory amount were many times 
smaller than that typically awarded in similar cases; or if it sometimes took 
years to receive an award.  We would regard such a compensatory regime as 
grossly unfair.  Yet that is precisely the state of statutory wrongful conviction 
compensation in the United States today. 
The problem is not the lack of public recognition of wrongful convictions.  
They are widely reported in the press, on social media, and by advocacy 
groups; podcasts are now devoted to the subject.  Nor is the problem a lack of 
understanding of the horror of wrongful conviction.  The New York State Law 
Revision Commission, which recommended New York’s wrongful conviction 
compensation statute, claimed that wrongful incarceration is “the most serious 
deprivation of individual liberty that a society may impose.”369  Many states, 
however, simply have not caught up with Professor Borchard’s vision of dec-
ades ago, much less today’s understanding that grievous errors occur in the 
criminal justice system, and that innocent people are profoundly harmed as a 
result.  While it is difficult to view Kirk Odom and Santae Tribble as men 
blessed by good fortune, they were lucky to have been wrongly convicted in 
the District of Columbia and fairly compensated as a result.  The vast majority 
of exonerees are not so fortunate. 
Appealing to the moral sensibilities of state legislatures has, to a very real 
degree, helped make progress in several states.  The empirical research pre-
sented here may, it is hoped, provide the basis for an economic argument that 
most states can compensate exonerees more generously and more equitably.  
Highlighting those states with creative approaches to serving the very real med-
ical, vocational, and social service needs of exonerees may encourage states 
that have not revisited their statutes in many years to incorporate similar con-
cepts. 
 
 369. Baba-Ali v. State, 878 N.Y.S.2d 555, 587–88 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2009) (quoting 
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR ON 
REDRESS FOR INNOCENT PERSONS UNJUSTLY CONVICTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY 
IMPRISONED, 1984 McKinney’s Laws of New York 2899, 2903)). 
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Recent scholarship focuses on another benefit.  A recent study of 118 ex-
onerees from Florida, Illinois, Texas, and New York, 71 of whom received 
some compensation, examined the amounts received and the rates at which ex-
onerees committed post-exoneration offenses.370  The authors found that “[t]he 
mean amount of compensation for those with no post-exoneration offense was 
$1.7 million, as compared to $720,000 for those who had at least one post-
exoneration offense.”371  In addition, the researchers concluded that those who 
received more than $500,000, including those with a previous history of crim-
inal behavior, were significantly less likely to offend post-release.372  The re-
searchers believed that the need for a threshold level of support to surmount 
known barriers to reentry and the fostering of positive feelings toward a justice 
system that once failed them may explain the link between more generous com-
pensation and lower recidivism.373  Perhaps additional scholarship will focus 
on the benefits of social services to reduce recidivism as well. 
The path forward requires recognition of the progress made, particularly 
by a few states, such as Minnesota, Colorado, Washington, Texas, and Ala-
bama, that have at least in part broken the mold of the standard state compen-
sation statute.  But, it also requires a forthright acknowledgement that, with the 
exception of Texas, the states with these better compensation statutes have, 
ironically, relatively few potential beneficiaries of them.  That is why it is im-
portant to candidly recognize state fiscal concerns and to develop concrete 
ideas to respond to them, such as the creation of Wrongful Conviction Trust 
Funds, installment payments, offsets, and sensible limits on certain services for 
those wrongly incarcerated for relatively brief periods. 
As important, the exonerated are better served by moving from a deper-
sonalized compensation regime to one that offers an election of remedy that 
permits them, to some degree, to select a remedial path better suited for their 
personal needs and circumstances.  I cannot say that I know which path my 
clients might have taken if offered that choice in the D.C. Act.  But, I can say 
that it could be appealing to forego litigation and a potentially sizeable recovery 
in exchange for an expedited, less adversarial, and more holistic approach that, 




 370. Mandery et al., supra note 337, at 571. 
 371. Id. at 572. 
 372. Id. at 556. 
 373. Id. at 576. 
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